



# Semiannual Report to Congress

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APRIL 1, 2024 – SEPTEMBER 30, 2024

Social Security Administration  
Office of the Inspector General





I am honored to provide interim leadership to the Social Security Administration (SSA) Office of the Inspector General (OIG), pursuant to my designation by the President of the United States (U.S.) as the Acting Inspector General (IG), effective September 30, 2024.

Since 2018, I have been at the forefront of ensuring accountability, integrity, and efficiency within the Small Business Administration's (SBA) programs and operations as SBA's IG. I am excited to build on my track record of success. I believe deeply in SSA OIG's mission to serve the public through independent oversight of SSA's programs and operations, and I am eager to drive meaningful change to protect taxpayer dollars. Among my early priorities, I plan to strengthen employee engagement SSA OIG-wide and deepen our data analytics capabilities. Both of those efforts will help to position the organization for sustained success.

I am pleased to present this Fall 2024 Semiannual Report to Congress (SAR), detailing SSA OIG's significant accomplishments, key activities, and ongoing efforts. SSA OIG audits provide SSA with recommendations and insights to improve SSA programs and operations to benefit taxpayers. During this reporting period, our Office of Audit issued 41 audit reports, which included 16 reports that identified, in total, more than \$1.3 billion in questioned costs and nearly \$10.5 billion in funds put to better use.

High quality investigative work is essential to combatting fraud and identifying and addressing fraud risks. During this reporting period, the work of our Office of Investigations (OI) resulted in 288 indictments/criminal informations and 248 convictions. OI also produced nearly \$105 million in monetary accomplishments, which includes court-ordered restitutions, recoveries, settlements, judgements, and estimated savings to SSA.


Since joining SSA OIG, I have been impressed by employees' resilience, professionalism, and an unwavering dedication to the mission. Their diligent efforts contributed to a significant return-on-investment, as described in this SAR. I am grateful for the opportunity to work with SSA OIG's staff to further the important mission of this organization.

**Hannibal "Mike" Ware**  
*Acting Inspector General*

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<b>AFI</b>	Access to Financial Institutions
<b>ALJ</b>	Administrative Law Judge
<b>ALS</b>	Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis
<b>CDI</b>	Cooperative Disability Investigations
<b>Circular A-123</b>	<i>Circular No. A-123, Management's Responsibility for Enterprise Risk Management and Internal Control</i>
<b>CDR</b>	continuing disability review
<b>CMP</b>	Civil Monetary Penalty
<b>DC</b>	Deputy Commissioner
<b>DDS</b>	Disability Determination Services
<b>DI</b>	Disability Insurance
<b>DoJ</b>	U.S. Department of Justice
<b>DWI</b>	driving while intoxicated
<b>ED</b>	U.S. Department of Education
<b>EIDL</b>	Economic Injury Disaster Loan
<b>ERM</b>	Enterprise Risk Management
<b>eRPS</b>	Electronic Representative Payee System
<b>FAA</b>	Federal Aviation Administration
<b>FBI</b>	Federal Bureau of Investigation
<b>FFMIA</b>	<i>Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996</i>
<b>FY</b>	fiscal year
<b>ICE</b>	Immigration and Customs Enforcement
<b>IG</b>	Inspector General
<b>IG Act</b>	<i>Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended</i>
<b>MBR</b>	Master Beneficiary Record
<b>MDHHS</b>	Michigan Department of Health and Human Services
<b>NOSSCR</b>	National Organization of Social Security Claims Representatives
<b>NAFC</b>	National Anti-Fraud Committee
<b>OA</b>	Office of Audit
<b>OASDI</b>	Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance
<b>OI</b>	Office of Investigations
<b>OIG</b>	Office of the Inspector General or Office of Inspector General
<b>payee</b>	representative payee
<b>PC</b>	processing center
<b>PPP</b>	Paycheck Protection Program
<b>PUA</b>	Pandemic Unemployment Assistance

<b>RSI</b>	Retirement and Survivors Insurance
<b>SAR</b>	Semiannual Report to Congress
<b>SBA</b>	Small Business Administration
<b>SBC</b>	Statutory Benefit Continuation
<b>SDVOSB</b>	Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business
<b>Section 1140</b>	Section 1140 of the <i>Social Security Act</i>
<b>SSA</b>	Social Security Administration
<b>SSI</b>	Supplemental Security Income
<b>SSN</b>	Social Security number
<b>U.S.</b>	United States
<b>USDA</b>	U.S. Department of Agriculture
<b>VA</b>	U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
<b>VBA</b>	Veterans Benefits Administration
<b>WPC</b>	Whistleblower Protection Coordinator





## \$104,872,558

### Monetary Accomplishments

This number includes court-ordered restitution, recoveries, settlements, judgments, fines, and estimated savings resulting from our investigations.



## \$1,368,774,227

### Questioned Costs


Questioned costs include costs that we determined, based on our audits: (1) violated a provision of a law, regulation, contract, grant, cooperative agreement, or other agreement or document governing the expenditure of funds; (2) were not supported by adequate documentation; or (3) were unnecessary or unreasonable.



## \$10,494,338,993


### Funds Put to Better Use

Funds put to better use are funds that SSA could use more efficiently if it took action to implement our recommendations.



The number of investigative reports includes summary reports of investigative findings issued externally by OI, including prosecution referrals, reports of employee investigations, reports of special investigations, and reports of findings by a Cooperative Disability Investigations (CDI) unit.

This includes Audit Reports, Audit Memorandum Reports, Informational Reports, Management Advisory Reports, and Congressional Status Updates on Social Security-related Scams.



1. OIG conducts preliminary investigations to further develop allegations of activity that may threaten the integrity of SSA's programs and operations or involve the misuse of a Social Security number. A preliminary investigation may result in a full investigation being opened, when there is an articulable factual basis that reasonably indicates the alleged activity has occurred; however, some preliminary investigations never result in a full investigation. This statistic reports the level of investigation at the time of case closure.



**655**

## Persons Referred to the U.S. Department of Justice for Criminal Prosecution

This number includes individual subjects or entities referred to the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) where the investigative findings were not subject to pre-established prosecution declination guidelines.



**39,907**

## Imposter-Scam Allegations Received

This figure represents the number of imposter-scam allegations OIG received. The allegations may include scammers impersonating government employees or alleging Social Security-related problems to steal money or personal information. OIG receives imposter-scam allegations via multiple sources, including a dedicated, online, scam-reporting **form** that requests detailed characteristics about the reported scams.



**128**

## Persons Referred to State and Local Prosecutors for Criminal Prosecution

This number reflects the total number of individual subjects or entities referred to state and local prosecuting authorities where the investigative findings were not subject to pre-established prosecution declination guidelines. These persons may also have been referred to DoJ.



**248**

## Prosecutions and Convictions

This number reflects **236** sentencings and **12** pretrial diversions.

**288**



## Indictments/ Criminal Informations

This number includes indictment or criminal information filings per subject. It does not include subsequent or superseding indictments, and/or criminal informations for the same subject.



**192**

## Task Forces/Working Groups

During the reporting period, we were members of **192** task forces/working groups. This includes **15** related to COVID-19 fraud.



**182,515**

## Total Allegations Received

**1,242**

## Total Subpoenas Issued

This number is the total number of OIG subpoenas issued during this reporting period.<sup>2</sup>

2. In the Spring SAR 2024, we reported that we issued 1,159 subpoenas, then we later determined the correct number was 1,101.

**553**

## Safety and Threats

OIG received **553** allegations related to employee safety issues, of which **112** involved alleged assault or harassment, **394** were associated with threats against SSA employees or buildings, and **47** involved other safety threats.

**187**

## Unimplemented Recommendations

To provide SSA adequate time to implement our recommendations, we only report unimplemented recommendations 6 months after the end of the semi-annual period in which we provided them to the Agency.



**1,180**

## Administrative Actions

Administrative actions include benefits terminated, claims denied, administrative recoveries, reduction in benefits, removal of representative payee, benefits suspended, and personnel actions.



**1,035**

## Subjects with Administrative Actions



**\$6,707,071,036**

## Potential Cost Savings from Unimplemented Recommendations

This figure reflects the dollar value of aggregate potential cost savings for all reports issued prior to the commencement of this reporting period (which was April 1, 2024) with unimplemented monetary recommendations.

# Investigations Overview

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- | Allegations Received by Category
- | Cooperative Disability Investigations
- | Disability Insurance Fraud
- | Supplemental Security Income Fraud
- | Retirement and Survivors Insurance Fraud
- | Social Security Number Misuse
- | COVID-19 Relief Fraud
- | Employee Fraud and Employee Safety
- | Whistleblower Retaliation






OI receives and evaluates allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in SSA’s programs and operations, and takes appropriate action in coordination with federal, state, and local prosecutors. OI also investigates allegations of retaliation against whistleblowers who have made protected disclosures. Our investigations may result in criminal or civil prosecutions, Civil Monetary Penalties (CMPs), or Agency administrative actions. We received 182,515 allegations during this reporting period, shown by category in the chart below.

OI works closely with federal, state, and local law enforcement partners and participates on task forces and working groups, including those related to COVID-19 pandemic fraud. Subject matter experts provide support in areas such as digital forensics, policy, training, and analytics. OI also oversees the CDI program and manages OIG’s fraud hotline.

## Allegations Received by Category

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024



## Cooperative Disability Investigations

Although OIG broadly investigates fraud across all SSA programs, we have a dedicated **CDI** program that focuses on disability fraud. CDI units routinely investigate allegations of fraud before benefits are paid and support continuing disability reviews by providing evidence for determinations. Since 1997, CDI units have improved program integrity by resolving questions of fraud in Social Security disability claims.

A CDI unit consists of an OIG special agent who leads the unit and personnel from SSA, state agencies called Disability Determination Services (DDS), and state or local law enforcement partners. Stopping a fraudulent payment before it occurs, or as soon as it is suspected, is in the interests of SSA, OIG, and the taxpayers. By combining federal and state resources and expertise, CDI units benefit not only Social Security programs, but also other federal and state programs, such as food and nutrition assistance, housing assistance, Medicare, and Medicaid.

CDI units have contributed to a projected savings to taxpayers of more than \$8.2 billion since inception of the CDI program. During this reporting period, the work of CDI units led to 627 disability claims being denied or ceased, \$40,914,000 in projected savings for SSA programs, and \$9,852,150 in SSA monetary accomplishments in the form of recoveries, fines, judgments, restitution, and settlements. The CDI unit efforts also led to \$54,214,240 in projected savings for non-SSA programs.

The SSA and OIG worked with state and local partners to successfully expand CDI coverage in accordance with the *Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015*. Fifty CDI units now cover all fifty States, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories of Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, U.S. Virgin Islands, and American Samoa.

**Below, we highlight two CDI cases.**

### ☛ **Veteran Fined \$850,000 for Conspiracy to Defraud Government Agencies**

A veteran applied for DI benefits in 2011. He stated on his application that he had been unable to work since 2010, due to his medical condition. Subsequently, in 2013, the veteran received Individual Unemployability benefits from the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) for a service-connected disability. However, the veteran failed to disclose that he owned and operated two businesses that qualified for assistance from the Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) program. As a participant in the SDVOSB program, the veteran received millions of dollars in set-aside contracts.

Further, from 2011 to 2021, the veteran received benefits that he was not entitled to receive from SSA and VBA.

Moreover, agents learned that the veteran had made false statements to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) also related to his disabling condition. In February 2024, he stood trial for making false statements to FAA; the jury found him guilty.

In March 2024, the veteran pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the government and agreed to forfeit \$141,972, which was restitution of \$93,819 to VBA and \$48,153 to SSA.

In June 2024, a U.S. District Court judge sentenced the veteran to 3 years of probation, with the first 6 months in home confinement. In

addition to the restitution to SSA and VBA, the judge ordered him to pay a \$850,000 fine to FAA.

This was a joint investigation with the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) OIG and the Department of Transportation OIG.

### Arkansas Mother Sentenced for Stealing Government Money

In July 2005, a claimant applied for SSA disability benefits based on a learning disorder. She reported suffering from fatigue, and stomach, liver, and head pain daily. She reported her limited ability to function, indicating that she cannot "eat, sleep, and other" without help. SSA awarded her disability in 2006.

In 2013, she reported to SSA that she worked 1 hour per day housekeeping but stopped in 2012 due to cancer and knee surgery. However, this report was inconsistent with income she reported on her tax returns.

In 2016, an SSA employee realized the woman was receiving disability funds for intellectual disability (based on her 2005 application) while serving as the representative payee for SSA benefits for her mother, niece, and children. After further investigation, in 2018, SSA determined that she was never entitled to disability benefits for an intellectual disability because she was capable of serving as representative payee for her eight children, managing over \$8,000 monthly, negotiating two car loans, a home mortgage, and completing 24 college credits. SSA's fraud loss was \$98,532.

Further, she applied for federal financial aid from the U.S. Department of Education (ED) and received grants and loans based on false applications.

In September 2023, she pleaded guilty to theft of government funds. In April 2024, a judge sentenced her to 3 years of probation and ordered her to pay restitution of \$98,532 to SSA and \$39,973 to ED.

This was a joint investigation with ED OIG.

## Disability Insurance Fraud

DI fraud comprises a significant part of our investigative workload. DI fraud includes, among other activities, concealing work activity or medical improvement while receiving disability benefits, representative payee misuse, and deceased payee fraud.

**Below we highlight two DI cases.**

### Beneficiary Sentenced to 14 Months' Imprisonment for Social Security and VA Fraud

In a DI fraud case, worked jointly with the VA, agents investigated a man who concealed his work.

From 2015 to 2020, the man knowingly concealed and failed to disclose to SSA his work activity and income. He was also receiving Individual Unemployability benefits from the VA. In 2019, he falsely reported and misrepresented his work activity to VA.

As a result of his fraud, he received over \$300,000 from federal agencies that he should not have.

Following the investigation, in January 2024, the man pleaded guilty to false statements and failure to disclose occurrence affecting Social Security disability payments.

In August 2024, a judge sentenced him to 14 months' imprisonment and 3 years' supervised release. The judge also ordered restitution of \$315,371 of which \$159,722 is payable to SSA and \$155,648 payable to VA.

- Man Sentenced to 2 Years' Probation for Using Fraudulent Documents to Obtain Benefits**

In a second disability case, resulting from a VA OIG referral, agents investigated a man who fraudulently obtained Social Security DI and VA medical benefits.

From 2005 to 2023, the Indiana man claimed to be a disabled military veteran. He presented false documentation and information to SSA and VA to obtain benefits.

Following the joint investigation with VA OIG, in February 2024, the man pleaded guilty to theft of government funds and agreed to pay restitution of \$226,389 to SSA and VA.

In June 2024, he received a sentence of 24 months' probation, of which the first 8 months are on home detention. Additionally, he must repay \$129,717 to SSA and \$96,672 to VA.

## Supplemental Security Income Fraud

SSI is a means-tested program, and we work to ensure only those who are eligible for these critical benefits receive them. Eligibility for SSI primarily relies on self-reporting many factors including earnings, assets, resources, marital status, residency, and living arrangements, among others. We investigate allegations of many types of SSI fraud, including when someone falsifies a disability to become SSI-eligible or conceals a marriage, real estate, other assets, or their true country of residence from SSA, while receiving SSI payments.

**Below, we highlight two SSI cases.**

- SSI Claimant Ordered to Repay \$204,500 for Defrauding Government Agencies**

In an SSI investigation, our agents received a referral from the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS). It alleged that an SSI claimant, who was also the representative payee for her son's SSI benefits, was concealing her marriage and living arrangements from SSA.

SSA initially approved the woman's application for SSI benefits in November 2013. However, in December 2013, SSA notified her that she and her child, for whom she was the representative payee, were ineligible for benefits because her husband, who resided with her, had income that exceeded SSI eligibility limits.

In 2015, the woman falsely reported to SSA that her husband did not live in her household. By concealing that her husband lived in her home, SSA reinstated the SSI benefits for her in 2014, and for her son in 2015, with the woman acting as the representative payee.

As a result of entitlement to SSI, they became eligible for Medicaid and the MDHHS' Food Assistance Program.

In January 2024, the woman pleaded guilty to concealment of fact affecting entitlement to SSI. In May 2024, a judge sentenced her to 1 day of incarceration and 2 years of supervised release and ordered her to pay restitution of \$204,516 to the agencies she defrauded. Based on the benefits received for her and her son, she must repay \$91,195 to SSA, \$79,889 to Medicaid, and \$33,432 to the MDHHS for benefits received through the food assistance program.

- ### Ohio Woman Sentenced to Two Years in Federal Prison for Defrauding SSA and Other Government Agencies

In an SSI case, we conducted a joint investigation of an Ohio woman who used the identity of a deceased child to avoid a pending criminal prosecution, fraudulently obtain benefits from SSA, and defraud several other government agencies.

Beginning in 2010, the woman obtained an Ohio driver's license using the stolen identity, then obtained a SSN associated with the stolen identity. She then used the false identification in various contexts over the course of 13 years, including to apply for and receive food stamps, to obtain SSI disability benefits, and during the pandemic, to apply for five Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL). Further, the woman used the stolen identity to evade law enforcement and to file for bankruptcy.

In March 2024, the woman pleaded guilty to SSN fraud. In July 2024, the judge sentenced her to 24 months in prison, followed by 3 years of supervised release, and ordered her to pay \$190,992 in restitution as follows: \$19,570 to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA); \$43,352 to SSA; \$11,663 to the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services; and \$116,406 to Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.

This was a joint investigation with the USDA OIG, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, Health and Human Services OIG and the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles Investigations, Department of Labor OIG, and U.S. Marshals Service based on a referral from SSA.

## Retirement and Survivors Insurance Fraud

These investigations involve RSI benefits, including deceased payee fraud, representative payee misuse, false statements about marital or parental status in applying for survivors' benefits, and other related types of fraud.

**Below, we highlight two RSI fraud cases.**

- ### Judge Sentences Man to 31 Months' Confinement for Neglect of Three Minors

In an RSI case based on a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) referral, agents investigated a man and a woman for neglect, abuse, and the misuse of funds of three minors, members of the Cherokee Nation, receiving benefits. The couple became responsible for the children's care in 2018, and the woman served as the representative payee for the children's RSI benefits from 2019 to 2020.

Following the joint investigation with the FBI, in August 2022, both faced indictment for failing to provide adequate nutrition, affection, housing, and medical and dental care for the children. The woman, as the representative payee for the children, was also indicted for making false statements in a Representative Payee Report to SSA, and having received payments for but willfully converting them for use other than to benefit the children.

In March 2023, the man pleaded guilty to the charge of child neglect in Indian Country. The woman pleaded guilty, also in March 2023, to conversion of benefits by representative payee and making a false statement.

In April 2024, a U.S. District Court judge sentenced the man to 31 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release. Previously, a judge sentenced the woman to 6 months' incarceration, and 3 years of supervised release and ordered her to pay \$28,368 in restitution to SSA.

- ### Floridian Sentenced for Theft of Government Funds Intended for U.S. Veteran

From 2015 to 2018, a Florida woman was the legal custodian for a veteran who was receiving compensation from VBA. The veteran also received RSI benefits from SSA.

The woman failed in meeting several responsibilities as the legal custodian; for instance, she did not report to VA that the veteran's living situation changed and had moved into a VA funded facility, nor did she properly report how his funds were used and provided falsified financial accounting to a representative of the VBA. Further, the woman commingled the funds she received with her own personal income and used a portion of the veteran's benefits for herself.

Following the joint investigation with the VA she pleaded guilty to theft of government funds. In June 2024, the judge sentenced her to 3 years of probation and ordered her to pay \$177,600 in restitution; \$149,084 is payable to VA and \$28,516 is payable to SSA.

## Social Security Number Misuse

We work to ensure the integrity of SSNs, as SSA depends on them to accurately post earnings to individuals' records and calculate earned benefits. SSNs are used by not only SSA but also other agencies and entities, so we often pursue joint investigations into SSN misuse. We may investigate any situation in which a person misuses an SSN, whether for unauthorized work, obtaining a loan, applying for a government benefit, or any other purpose.

**Below, we highlight two cases involving SSN misuse.**

- ### SSN Misuse, Aggravated Identity Theft Leads to Two Years' Federal Imprisonment

In an SSN misuse investigation, a Jamaican national was convicted and sentenced to prison, supervised release, and restitution. The Jamaican national originally came to the United States on an immigrant visa in 1991. In 1999, an immigration judge ordered his removal pursuant to a felony conviction.

Instead of leaving, the man assumed the identity of a U.S. citizen. Using the stolen identity, including a birth certificate and SSN card, he applied for and received a Florida driver's license. Further, using the false identity, he worked and applied for other state and federal benefits. During the COVID-19 pandemic, he received over \$21,000 in unemployment insurance and Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation benefits fraudulently, and he obtained over \$1,200 in Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits.

Following the joint investigation with Department of Labor OIG, USDA OIG, and Homeland Security Investigations, the man pleaded guilty to false representation of a SSN and aggravated identity theft.

In May 2024, a judge sentenced him to 24 months plus 1 day of imprisonment, and one year of supervised release and ordered him to pay \$22,361 to the Florida Department of Commerce and USDA.

- Honduran National Sentenced for Repeated Illegal Re-entry and SSN Misuse**

In a second SSN misuse investigation, a U.S. District Court judge sentenced a Honduran national for illegal re-entry of a removed alien and illegal use of an SSN.

In May 2022, in Louisiana, police arrested a man for driving while intoxicated (DWI). Police obtained his fingerprints and the identification documents that the man presented as his own, including the SSN of a U.S. citizen.

In 2023, an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Deportation Officer connected the SSN used in the DWI arrest with a case involving the Honduran man whom ICE had removed from the U.S. in 2010. Without applying for admission, or receiving permission to re-enter, the Honduran man had returned to the U.S. In 2017, he was again removed, but he had subsequently gained entry once more at an unknown time and place thereafter.

ICE agents verified that the man arrested for the DWI was the same Honduran man twice removed from the U.S. Working jointly with SSA OIG, they further verified that the SSN did not belong to him but was assigned to a U.S. citizen.

As a result of the investigation, the man pleaded guilty to illegal use of an SSN and illegal re-entry of a removed alien. In June 2024, the judge sentenced him to time served.

## COVID-19 Relief Fraud

OIG plays an important role in addressing COVID-19 pandemic-related fraud throughout the federal government. SSN misuse, including identity theft, is a common thread running through a substantial number of pandemic investigative cases. During this reporting period, we participated in 15 COVID-19 fraud-related task forces and working groups and collaborated with other federal law enforcement entities on joint investigations related to COVID-19 pandemic relief, including Unemployment Insurance fraud and Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) fraud. We participated in the National COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Taskforce, led by the Deputy Attorney General of the U.S. We also worked with other federal, state, and local agencies to pursue SSN misuse and other crimes committed in relation to PPP fraud.

**Below, we highlight two COVID-19 relief cases.**

- Business Owner Sentenced to 7 Years in Prison for COVID-19 Relief-Related Fraud**

In April 2024, a U.S. District Court judge sentenced an Ohio woman following her jury conviction on all 14 counts on which she was indicted. This was a joint investigation with the FBI and other members of the Financial Crimes Working Group Pandemic Fraud Committee.

The investigation uncovered that the woman submitted six fraudulent applications to the SBA for PPP loans for six businesses. On each application, the woman identified herself as the owner, chief executive officer, or managing member and authorized representative of the business. On the applications, she falsely reported the number of employees and the amounts paid in wages. In total, she requested more than \$600,000 in pandemic relief assistance and received over \$19,000 for one

of the loan applications. The woman used the loan proceeds on expenses, goods, and services unrelated to those authorized by the PPP program and on personal expenses.

The woman also submitted several EIDL applications for businesses she owned and controlled, falsely reporting the number of employees and company revenues. On several of the applications, she used the name and SSN of another individual, a disabled relative of hers.

After her trial, the jury found the woman guilty of six counts of bank fraud, false statement on a loan or credit application, four counts of wire fraud, and three counts of aggravated identity theft. In April, a judge sentenced her to 84 months' incarceration, and 3 years of supervised release and ordered her to pay restitution to SBA of \$19,682.

- ### Disability Beneficiary Submitted Fraudulent Business Reports to Secure Pandemic Funds

A disability beneficiary was sentenced to 4 years of probation for making false statements.

SSA OIG initiated an investigation in a second case involving pandemic-related fraud, when a Special Agent noticed that the disabled beneficiary had received a \$150,000 EIDL loan. The investigation revealed the disability beneficiary, who applied for an EIDL loan from the SBA in 2020, made false statements.

In his EIDL application, the man claimed to own an event planning business. He falsely reported the business had 8 employees and \$493,000 in gross revenue in 2019. The SBA approved the loan for \$150,000 and wired funds to his account. The man then used the funds for personal expenses; none related to his business.

However, in his SSA disability file, the man had not reported any earnings or work history since 2016. Further, in 2023, he reported to SSA that he was self-employed from 2020-2022 and then stopped working due to heart complications.

His false earnings reports affected SSA's ability to properly calculate his disability payments. Moreover, he submitted fraudulent Internal Revenue Service documents to support his reports.

As a result of the investigation, the man pleaded guilty in November 2023, to making false statements. In April 2024, a judge sentenced him to 4 years of probation and ordered him to repay \$167,350 to the SBA.

## Employee Fraud and Employee Safety

Public integrity investigations are critical to ensuring we maintain the public trust in SSA's programs and operations. We must take swift action concerning allegations against employees who may have misused their position for personal gain or violated other laws or regulations in the performance of their official duties. We also must act when the safety of SSA employees is threatened.

**Below, we highlight two employee fraud case and one employee fraud case.**

- ### Threatening Letter to SSA Results in 20 Month Incarceration Sentence

In an employee safety case during this reporting period, a judge sentenced a Louisiana man to federal prison after he pleaded guilty to mailing threatening communications to an SSA Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). On December 15, 2022, the man mailed a letter addressed to the "Appeals Council" that contained a threat of injury to an ALJ. The man had handwritten and signed the letter.



Following the investigation, in February 2024, the man pleaded guilty to the charge of mailing of threatening communications. In May 2024, the judge sentenced him to a 20-month prison sentence, with credit for time served, followed by 3 years of supervised release.

- ### Beneficiary Jailed for Threats Against SSA Employees

In a second employee safety case during this reporting period, a judge sentenced a Texas man for influencing a Federal official by threat. This investigation resulted from a written communication sent to the SSA Comment Email Mailbox in January 2024.

In that email, the man, who was the sender, identified himself and stated that he had been unsuccessful in his several attempts to update his address with SSA. He also stated that he had filed a report with DoJ, FBI, and SSA OIG that SSA employees were breaking Federal law. And he wrote:

*I'm going to end up going to each local SSA office with my AR-15 and just shoot it up and all it's employees in it since they are playing with my lively hood I will play with there as well.*

The man had listed disabilities as depression, bipolar and related disorders, and had a criminal record based on his history of violent behavior. The man was also already banned from Social Security Offices based on prior threats. SSA OIG, Federal Protective Services, and state and local law enforcement jointly investigated the email threat. In June 2024, the man pleaded guilty, and a U.S. District Court judge sentenced him to time served and 2 years of supervised release with required participation in a mental health treatment program.

- ### Former Social Security Employee Sentenced to 36 Months in Prison for Pandemic Fraud Scheme

In an employee fraud case during this reporting period, a judge sentenced a former SSA employee to federal prison after she pleaded guilty to wire fraud and aggravated identity theft. The joint investigation resulted from two separate complaints to SSA alleging the former SSA employee used her position to obtain personally identifiable information and applied for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) funds using the stolen information.

The investigation found the former SSA employee filed PUA claims for ineligible recipients in exchange for payments from the individuals. In addition, the former SSA employee used her position to access SSA databases to obtain the personally identifiable information of unsuspecting individuals, file PUA claims on their behalf, and then divert the unemployment funds for her own use and benefit. Through the scheme, the former SSA employee defrauded the government of over \$288,000.

SSA OIG, Department of Labor OIG, and the United States Postal Inspection Service jointly investigated the former SSA employee's fraud scheme.

In November 2022, the former SSA employee pleaded guilty to the charge of wire fraud and aggravated identity theft. In April 2024, the judge sentenced her to 36 months in prison, followed by 3 years of supervised release. The former SSA employee was also ordered to pay \$288,590 to the Department of Labor.

## Whistleblower Retaliation

Section 5(a)(20) of the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended (*IG Act*), requires OIG to provide a detailed description of any instance of whistleblower retaliation, including information about the official found to have engaged in retaliation and what, if any, consequences the establishment imposed to hold that official accountable. There are no known instances of retaliation to report for this reporting period.

# Audit Overview

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- Improper Payments
- Potential Cost Savings from Unimplemented Recommendations
- Significant Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies



Our audit work helps SSA serve the American people by identifying opportunities for savings, better use of funds, and improvements in SSA's program management and results. We continue to deploy audit resources to address **SSA's top management and performance challenges**.

During this reporting period, these challenges included: (1) managing human capital; (2) improving service delivery; (3) protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of SSA's information systems and data; (4) modernizing information technology; (5) improving administration of the disability programs; and (6) improving the prevention, detection, and recovery of improper payments. We also conduct reviews at the request of Congress.

This reporting period, we issued 41 audit reports.<sup>3</sup> This includes 16 audit reports that identified over \$11.8 billion in potential cost savings and 25 reports with non-monetary recommendations or no recommendations. See **Appendix B** and **Appendix C** for statistical tables showing potential cost savings, including those for which no management decision had been made by the commencement of the reporting period, and **Appendix D** for the full list of reports issued during this reporting period.

## Improper Payments

According to a **Social Security Fact Sheet**, SSA estimated in 2024 an average of almost 68 million Americans per month would receive a Social Security benefit, totaling about \$1.5 trillion in benefits paid during the year.


Given the magnitude of SSA payments, even the slightest error in the payment process can result in millions of dollars in over or underpayments. Per the most recent estimates available, SSA estimates it made approximately \$10.6 billion in improper payments in fiscal year (FY) 2023. Of those, \$8.9 billion were overpayments and \$1.7 billion were underpayments.

During this period, we issued 17 audit reports related to the management challenge, "Improve the Prevention, Detection, and Recovery of Improper Payments." Our work related to this management challenge identified over \$1.3 billion in questioned costs and over \$9.4 billion in funds put to better use and included 44 recommendations.

We continuously engage SSA to ensure timely resolution of all recommendations. As shown in detail in **Appendix E**, SSA had not implemented 25 significant monetary recommendations from FYs 2017 through 2023, offering potential cost savings of about \$5 billion. As shown on the following chart, potential cost savings from all unimplemented recommendations increased from \$5.1 billion to about \$6.7 billion from FY 2023 to FY 2024. The number of unimplemented recommendations increased from 141 to 187 over the same period.<sup>4</sup>

3. This includes 28 Audit Reports, 8 Management Advisory Reports, 4 Information Reports, and 1 Audit Memorandum Report.  
 4. To provide SSA adequate time to implement our recommendations, we only report unimplemented recommendations six months after the close of the semi-annual period in which we provided them to the Agency. The FY 2024 figure includes audits issued through March 31, 2024. Numbers are comparative to prior years' Fall SARs. We will report end of year figures for FY 2024 (through September 30, 2024) in the Spring 2025 SAR.

## Potential Cost Savings from Unimplemented Recommendations



## Significant Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies

### Preventing, Detecting, and Recovering Improper Payments

Improper payments can be overpayments (when SSA pays someone more than they are due) or underpayments (when SSA pays someone less than they are due).

We issued this report to summarize the OIG’s audit work related to SSA’s efforts to prevent, detect, and recover improper payments, which we have identified as a major management challenge for SSA since FY 2002. While we applaud SSA for taking steps to address improper payments, there is more SSA can

do. SSA has not implemented many of our recommendations in our prior audit reports, and other actions have not fully addressed our findings.

For example, from FYs 2015 through 2022, SSA paid almost \$8.6 trillion in benefits and made approximately \$71.8 billion (0.84 percent) in improper payments, most of which were overpayments. SSA must be a responsible steward of the funds entrusted to its care by minimizing the risk of making improper payments and recovering overpayments when they occur.

Without better access to data, increased automation, systems modernization, and policy or legislative changes, improper payments will continue to be an issue into the future.

### Challenges in Recovering Supplemental Security Income Overpayments

An SSI payment amount can vary month-to-month, depending on whether there are changes in a recipient’s eligibility factors, such as resources, income, and/or living arrangements. We conducted this audit to determine whether SSA followed policies and used available tools, to prevent, detect, and recover SSI overpayments.

Our audit report found that SSA made errors on overpayments for 189 (47 percent) of 400 sampled SSI recipients. We estimate this affected SSI overpayments for 1.9 million recipients. For 1.7 million of these recipients, we estimated error amounts totaling over \$7 billion. Errors occurred because employees did not always (1) follow policy or use available tools to prevent and detect overpayments; (2) send recipients complete and accurate due-process notices before they initiated recovery of overpayments; (3) follow policy when they processed overpayment waivers; or (4) follow policy and use available tools to recover overpayments.

We made nine recommendations to improve SSA’s use of policies and available tools to prevent, detect, and recover SSI overpayments. SSA agreed with our recommendations.

- Representative Payees Not in the Electronic Representative Payee System; Discrepancies in the Electronic Representative Payee System; and Disabled Beneficiaries Receiving Direct Payments Who Previously Had Representative Payees**

SSA appoints a representative payee (payee) for a beneficiary who cannot manage or direct the management of their Social Security benefits because of their youth or mental and/or physical impairments. SSA uses the Electronic Representative Payee System (eRPS) to process payee applications. We conducted three audits on the accuracy and completeness of information in eRPS.

We conducted the audit *Representative Payees Not in the eRPS* to determine whether SSA employees properly processed payees’ applications in eRPS. We found SSA did not always: resolve pending payee applications; properly process payee applications to establish, re-establish, or record payees in eRPS; and record individual payees’ SSNs on payment records whose pending payees in eRPS had SSNs that differed from the payees on the payment records or who did not have representative payees in eRPS. We estimate approximately 102,500 beneficiaries have been affected by SSA failing to take the necessary action. Further, we estimate SSA has paid: (1) approximately \$772 million in benefits to someone other than the payees who were pending in eRPS and (2) approximately \$467 million to payees for whom there was no application or evidence supporting employees’ decisions to select or reinstate these payees. We recommended SSA improve controls to ensure it resolves pending payee selections in eRPS, properly establishes or records the payees in

eRPS, and records payees’ SSNs on the payment records. SSA agreed with our recommendations.

In *Discrepancies in the eRPS*, we found SSA did not ensure payee information in eRPS was accurate. Specifically, we found SSA: did not resolve payee discrepancies; overstated the number of active payees in eRPS, which may result in the Agency using inaccurate information to conduct trend analysis or to report to Congress; and incorrectly recorded the types of payees, which resulted in SSA either not obtaining the required accounting reports or obtaining unnecessary reports. Because the information was not accurate, we estimate approximately 28,900 beneficiaries were affected. Further, we estimate SSA paid \$22.8 million to incorrect payees. We made four recommendations for SSA: to review the beneficiaries in our samples with payee discrepancies; based on the result of its review of the beneficiaries in our samples, determine whether it should review the remaining beneficiaries in our population; remind employees to create and process payee applications and updates in eRPS, take necessary manual actions to transfer the payee information to the payment records, and follow-up on their actions and resolve alerts; and establish a process to ensure employees resolve inconsistencies between eRPS and information in payment records. SSA agreed with our recommendations.

In *Disabled Beneficiaries Receiving Direct Payments Who Previously Had Representative Payees*, we found SSA did not ensure employees made complete and accurate capability determinations for disabled beneficiaries who previously had payees. For an estimated 19,000 disabled beneficiaries who previously had payees and who received approximately \$887 million in payment directly from SSA, there was no evidence SSA determined the beneficiaries were capable of managing, or directing the management of, their benefits or that SSA performed proper follow up development. In

In addition, we estimate SSA did not properly document capability determinations for approximately 6,700 beneficiaries. This occurred because SSA did not have effective controls to ensure employees properly documented their capability determinations, authorized direct payments in accordance with SSA policy, and properly performed the follow-up reviews after they made interim direct payment to those beneficiaries. We made three recommendations for SSA to: make or document capability determinations for beneficiaries in the sample who did not have them; improve system controls to ensure employees complete and document capability determinations that comply with SSA policies; and issue a reminder to ensure employees follow policy when authorizing direct payments, while they continue developing for payees, follow up to assess how beneficiaries are managing their benefits, and document the results of the follow ups. SSA agreed with our recommendations.

## Disability Waiting Period Exclusions

Generally, Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) beneficiaries eligible for benefits based on a disability must complete a 5-month waiting period after the disability onset date before payments begin. However, beneficiaries may be immediately entitled to benefits if they meet certain exclusions—Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) disability, childhood disability, re-entitlement to disability benefits within 5 years of a prior cessation, disabled widow(er)s re-entitled within 7 years, or disabled widow(er)s with SSI credit. We conducted this audit to determine whether SSA accurately applied the law and policy pertaining to disability waiting period exclusions for OASDI beneficiaries.

SSA incorrectly applied the 5-month waiting period for 222 (36 percent) of 615 sampled beneficiaries. Errors occurred because of insufficient policies and controls related to the waiting period exclusions. In addition, SSA

did not identify all beneficiaries with ALS who were affected by a law change to ensure they received proper payments.

Based on the results of our sample, we estimate SSA incorrectly applied the waiting period to 5,114 beneficiaries, which resulted in underpayments totaling approximately \$14 million.

We made five recommendations to improve SSA’s accuracy in applying the law and policy pertaining to disability waiting period exclusions for OASDI beneficiaries, including taking corrective action on cases we identified, reviewing additional populations of beneficiaries, updating policies, and creating integrity checks to identify scenarios where the waiting period was applied incorrectly. SSA agreed with our recommendations.

## Reducing Processing Centers’ Pending Actions

SSA’s eight processing centers (PC) support field and hearing offices by handling appeal decisions, collecting debt, correcting records, performing program integrity work, and processing other complex Social Security retirement, survivors, and disability benefit payment decisions. We conducted this audit to determine whether SSA met its goal to reduce the number of pending actions at PCs.

SSA met its goal in 4 of the FYs between FY 2018 through 2023. SSA reported it did not meet its goal in the remaining 2 FYs because of unexpected staff reductions, increased workloads, and less than expected overtime funding it would have used to pay employees to process more pending actions. Although SSA achieved its goal in 4 of the last 6 FYs, the Agency did not achieve an overall reduction in PC pending actions during that period. This occurred because SSA’s goals varied each year and were not always established at a level that ensured the number of pending cases decreased from year to year.

As a result, the number of pending cases increased from 3.2 million in FY 2018 to 4.6 million in FY 2023.

Delays in processing PC pending actions can lead to higher improper payments, which increased some beneficiaries' financial burden as they waited longer for underpayments or were charged with increased overpayment amounts. If SSA resolved the PC pending actions we reviewed at the earliest possible instance, we estimate it would have determined approximately 528,000 beneficiaries were improperly paid approximately \$534 million. At the time of our review, many of the PC pending actions had been pending for longer than 12 months, and the improper payment amount had increased to approximately \$1.1 billion.

We recommended SSA: develop a workload and staffing plan to ensure the pending actions backlog is reduced from year to year; develop PC pending actions performance measures with goals to reduce the pending actions year to year; and establish timeframe targets for PC workloads to limit increases to improper payments caused by processing delays. SSA agreed with our recommendations but indicated that its ability to implement them is contingent upon sustained adequate funding to allow for necessary hiring, overtime availability, and improved technology.

- ### Social Security Administration's Enterprise Risk Management

Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is an agency-wide approach to addressing internal and external organizational risks by understanding the combined impact of risks as an interrelated portfolio, rather than addressing risks within silos. We conducted our audit to determine whether SSA's ERM program complies with the Office of Management and Budget's *Circular No. A-123, Management's Responsibility for Enterprise Risk Management and Internal Control*, issued on July 15, 2016 (*Circular A-123*). In response to *Circular A-123*, SSA developed a maturity model with five

distinct phases, starting at Initial and ending at Advanced, which indicates a mature ERM, to help guide and evaluate its implementation.

Our audit found that SSA is complying with *Circular A-123* ERM requirements; however, its ERM capability is less mature than expected based on the implementation plans it created in accordance with OMB guidance. While OMB's guidance does not require implementation by a certain date, SSA revised its expected maturity date from FY 2024 to FY 2028 and appears to be behind schedule to meet that goal. Despite *Circular A-123* being issued in 2016, as of FY 2023, SSA was still at the Emerging phase, the second of five maturity levels. SSA initially planned to reach ERM maturity, the fifth or Advanced level in FY 2024 but later revised its maturity date to FY 2028. Without a mature ERM, SSA continues to manage risks in separate silos, not collaboratively, hindering a risk-aware culture and a common understanding of risk across the Agency.

We recommended SSA make ERM implementation a priority by providing the ERM team the resources it needs to ensure ERM reaches maturity no later than the planned date of FY 2028, in accordance with SSA's current *ERM Implementation Plan*, and that it ensure as it is working toward reaching maturity that its ERM Council, a committee of senior executives, including Deputy Commissioners from multiple components, is providing leadership over the ERM program and that key *Circular A-123* requirements are completed. SSA agreed with our recommendations.

- ### Supplemental Security Income Recipients Who Under-report Financial Account Balances

SSA uses the Access to Financial Institutions (AFI) application to verify SSI applicants' and recipients' alleged financial account information, verify financial account balances, and identify undisclosed accounts. SSA verifies resource values if the applicant or



recipient alleges resource values that total \$400 or more and there is at least 1 month of potential SSI eligibility or there is a resource-related event. We conducted this audit to determine whether SSA's financial account validation process for applicants and recipients who alleged having less than \$400 in financial accounts led to accurate SSI determinations and found it did not.

We identified 27 of 140 applicants/recipients for whom SSA made inaccurate SSI determinations and received \$130,430 in SSI payments for which they were not eligible. Based on our sample results, we estimate that SSA made incorrect determinations for 198,960 recipients and paid them \$718 million in SSI payments for which they were not eligible.

AFI reports showed 102 of 140 applicants/recipients under-reported their financial account balances by \$100 or more. Additionally, the AFI reports showed 28 of the applicants/recipients owned financial accounts of which SSA was unaware. We estimate that 800,140 applicants/recipients under-reported their financial account balances to SSA by \$100 or more, with 219,640 applicants/recipients failing to report all the financial accounts they owned.

We recommended SSA lower its \$400 resource-level tolerance for AFI application use to \$0 to help ensure more accurate SSI resource determinations when processing initial claims, pre-effectuation review contacts, and redeterminations. SSA disagreed with our recommendation, stating that it "agreed to complete an expansion study for AFI and assess the effectiveness of lowering the countable liquid resource tolerance to \$0" in response to a previous audit. However, as noted in our report, SSA's financial account validation process leads to overpayments that SSA could prevent if it lowered the resource tolerance. Additionally, as noted in its response, SSA first acknowledged this concern in response to an audit issued in May

2022, but has yet to take action to address it. We believe SSA needs to implement our recommendation or prioritize the completion of its study to assess the effectiveness of lowering the countable liquid resource tolerance.

# Legal Overview

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- Civil Monetary Penalty Program
- Review of Legislation and Regulations
- Whistleblower Protection Coordinator Education



## Civil Monetary Penalty Program

**Section 1140 of the *Social Security Act* (Section 1140)** authorizes CMPs to protect the public from advertisements, solicitations, and other communications (including websites and scam telephone calls) that may convey the false impression SSA approved, endorsed, or authorized the communication. It also prohibits the reproduction and sale of SSA publications and forms without authorization and places restrictions on the charging for services SSA provides to the public without charge. SSA's CMP program to enforce Section 1140 has been delegated to the Inspector General (IG) and has been an effective administrative enforcement alternative when criminal or civil prosecution is declined or not feasible.

This reporting period, SSA OIG continued our robust Section 1140-related educational outreach initiatives. As part of SSA OIG's outreach initiative to public libraries, SSA OIG attended the American Library Organization Conference at the San Diego Convention Center from June 28 through July 1, 2024. SSA OIG made over 130 contacts from 38 states at this conference, including libraries, universities/colleges, government agencies, and not-for-profits. SSA OIG continues to follow-up with these contacts and provide educational materials for their distribution. SSA OIG engaged in calls with various libraries and presented to the Los Angeles County Library's bimonthly all-managers call on September 12, 2024, regarding scam prevention.

In furtherance of SSA OIG's disability representative and attorney outreach program, SSA OIG presented virtually on Section 1140 at the National Organization of Social Security Claims Representatives' (NOSSCR) annual conference on May 9, 2024. Because the members of NOSSCR provide services to some of the most vulnerable Americans, they are an ideal organization for an outreach initiative. SSA OIG's presentation highlighted various types of scams used by fraudsters via mail, phone calls, and the internet. SSA OIG provided NOSSCR's members

information they can use to educate their clients, as well as pointers for the NOSSCR members to keep in mind as they develop their own marketing and advertising. Further, the Virginia Bar Association has posted educational outreach information provided by SSA OIG on their website for their members.

We initiated Section 1140 inquiries that resulted in the removal of 17 misleading or imposter social media pages or websites. We also secured voluntary compliance from a disability representation firm to revise a client form to remove the potentially misleading use of the phrase "Social Security" on the form header; a seller marketing a financial modeling product using SSA images that agreed to discontinue selling the product; and a U.S. General Services Administration-approved contractor that made modifications to its SSA-branded office supply marketing practices. Finally, SSA OIG sent an education letter to a major disability representation firm due to complaints of confusion as to whether claimants were speaking to SSA or to a private entity. SSA OIG imposed no Section 1140 CMPs during this reporting period.

## Review of Legislation and Regulations

Section 4(a)(2), codified at 5 U.S.C. § 404(a)(2), of the *IG Act*, requires OIG to review existing and proposed legislation and regulations, and make recommendations concerning the impact of such legislation or regulations on the economy and efficiency of, or the prevention and detection of fraud in SSA programs and operations. In addition to communicating directly with congressional staff as needed to discuss legislative issues, below are examples of the way we accomplished this statutory requirement during this reporting period.

### **Reviewed proposed legislation and regulations, including the following:**

- A proposal to establish a Government Spending Oversight Committee within the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

- A proposal to expand the scope of reporting requirements related to fraud and improper payments.
- A proposal to establish a governance structure for federal agencies' use of artificial intelligence.

## Whistleblower Protection Coordinator Education

Section 3(d) of the *IG Act* requires the IG to designate a Whistleblower Protection Coordinator (WPC) to carry out certain key functions, including educating SSA employees and managers about prohibitions on retaliation for protected disclosures. Additionally, the WPC is responsible for educating employees who have made or are contemplating making a protected disclosure about the rights and remedies available to them.

On December 22, 2023, the IG designated the Chief Investigative Counsel as the WPC.

Attorneys working with the WPC reviewed and revised the training provided to new employees on whistleblower rights and protections and conducted several sessions of new Employee Whistleblower Training as part of OIG's New Employee Orientation. The team also reviewed and revised the process for monitoring the WPC mailbox to ensure that whistleblower education letters are provided promptly. The WPC plans to collaborate with SSA's Office of Civil Rights and Equal Opportunity and SSA's Office of Personnel to enhance whistleblower rights education on SSA's internal electronic platforms.

# Social Security-Related Imposter Scams

- Public Outreach and Education
- Scam-Related Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions
- Civil Enforcement
- Status Updates on Social Security-Related Imposter Scams



In a Social Security-related imposter scam, a scammer claims to be an SSA or other government employee. Scammers may threaten arrest or other legal action unless one immediately pays a fine or fee, promise a benefit increase or other assistance in exchange for payment, or demand personal information. Scammers often require payment by retail gift card, cash, wire transfer, digital currency, or prepaid debit card. These scams primarily use the telephone, but some scams also use email, text messages, social media, or U.S. Mail. Many of the scams originate overseas.

OIG has established a multidisciplinary team of professionals that develops and implements innovative approaches to combat these scams through public outreach and education, criminal investigations and prosecution, and civil enforcement.

## Public Outreach and Education

OIG, in coordination with SSA, collaborates with all levels of government, leverages anti-fraud interests of private companies, and engages with special interest groups who focus on combatting fraud, protecting vulnerable populations, and reaching underserved communities. We regularly engage with the media to reach new audiences, including through television and podcast interviews, social media, and print media. We continue to expand our reach by fostering strategic relationships and identifying new alliances.

## Scam-Related Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions

OIG criminal investigators and investigative counsel work diligently to develop leads, prosecute criminals, and disrupt scams.

**Below, we highlight two Social Security-related scam cases.**

### Four Defendants Sentenced in Multi-million Dollar Check-kiting Conspiracy

In a scam-related investigation, a U.S. District Court judge sentenced several members of a check-kiting scheme. From 2015 through 2019, the participants in the scheme deliberately wrote bad checks from accounts they controlled (“feeder accounts”) and deposited the checks at other bank accounts (“payoff accounts”) that they also controlled. The participants would take a portion of the funds from the payoff accounts before the banks determined that the feeder accounts were unable to fund the checks.

Participants in the schemes often used false or stolen identities and obtained funds by using debit cards, writing checks, or withdrawing cash. As part of the scheme, they would also open credit card accounts, and establish good credit lines before making purchases and abandoning the accounts.

This joint investigation with the U.S. Postal Inspection Service led to the successful prosecution of the case. During this reporting period, four of the conspirators, who had previously pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, were sentenced.

In March 2024, “Conspirator A” received a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment, 2 years’ supervised release, and must pay restitution of \$573,225 to victims. That same month,

“Conspirator B” received a sentence of 2 years’ probation and must pay restitution of \$34,233 to victims.

In April 2024, “Conspirator C” received a sentence of 4 months’ imprisonment, 3 years’ supervised release, and must pay restitution \$66,725 to victims; and “Conspirator D” received a sentence of time served, 3 years’ supervised release, and must pay restitution of \$34,233 to victims.

#### Connecticut Man Sentenced to 2 Years’ Incarceration for Money Laundering in a Scheme that Defrauded SSA

In a Social Security-related imposter scam, a Connecticut man schemed with fraudsters, who used the personally identifiable information, such as names, addresses, dates of birth, SSNs, etc., of SSA beneficiaries to divert funds from the SSA beneficiaries’ true bank accounts to other accounts the fraudsters established and controlled.

Working with the fraudsters, the man participated in the scheme from August 2021 through July 2023. The man established multiple bank accounts under his control at different banks to receive the redirected benefits. The man would obtain the SSA funds from accounts he opened and would then wire most of the stolen funds to other accounts in Jamaica or Mexico, under the control of other fraudsters. The remaining portion of the funds was the man’s payment. The man used monies paid to him for bills, clothing, food deliveries, groceries, and personal travel. The man received more than \$360,000 into accounts that he controlled.

In March 2024, following our investigation, the man pleaded guilty to money laundering. In June 2024, a U.S. District Court judge sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment, 3 years of supervised released, and ordered him to pay \$161,000 in restitution for his role in the scheme.

## Civil Enforcement

As discussed in the Legal Overview section, OIG enforces Section 1140, a consumer protection law that prohibits misleading consumers by giving a false impression of association with, or authorization or endorsement by, SSA through any type of communication.

OIG continues to notify gateway providers of their potential civil liability, encourage proactive techniques to block transmission of scam calls, and where appropriate, impose fines. Working together with federal and state law enforcement partners, the team shares knowledge, strategizes based on its analyses of industry trends, and coordinates parallel enforcement actions for maximum national consumer protection impact.

## Status Updates on Social Security-Related Imposter Scams

Since October 2019, we have provided updates on our efforts to combat Social Security-related imposter scams to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Social Security; U.S. Senate Committee on Finance; and U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging. OIG began publicly releasing those updates in FY 2021. The **reports** share information about Social Security-related and government imposter scam allegation trends and address our ongoing efforts to raise public awareness of and disrupt them. The reports also provide a brief analysis of scam allegation data and highlight scam-related investigations and outreach.

This reporting period, we published two Quarterly Scam Updates covering the first quarter of FY 2024 (October 1, 2023, to December 31, 2023) and the second quarter of FY 2024 (January 1, 2024, to March 31, 2024).

National  
Anti-Fraud  
Committee

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The National Anti-Fraud Committee (NAFC) is a partnership between SSA and SSA OIG that supports strategies for combatting fraud, waste, and abuse in SSA programs and operations. The NAFC co-chairs are SSA's Deputy Commissioner (DC) for the Office of Analytics, Review, and Oversight and SSA OIG's Chief Strategy Officer. Other SSA voting members include all of its DCs, Chief Actuary, and General Counsel. Non-voting members include SSA's Associate Commissioner for the Office of Program Integrity, Lead Regional Commissioner for Fraud, Chief Information Security Officer, and all of SSA OIG's Assistant IGs and the Chief Counsel to the IG.

The NAFC meets quarterly to share information and create concrete steps for addressing SSA fraud. In July 2024, SSA and SSA OIG jointly held the fourth annual National Anti-Fraud Summit to understand and address fraud issues facing SSA. This Summit focused partially on AI and featured speakers including: the Office of Management and Budget Deputy Director of Management, the Department of Homeland Security Chief Technology Officer, and SSA's Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer. The Summit also included presentations on current trends, updates, and outcomes in the SSA referral and investigative processes. Additionally, during this reporting period, NAFC held two quarterly meetings, in May and September 2024.

# Appendix A-M

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**Appendix A:** Reporting Requirements

**Appendix B:** Reports with Questioned Costs

**Appendix C:** Reports with Funds Put to Better Use

**Appendix D:** Office of Audit Reports Issued

**Appendix E:** Significant Monetary Recommendations from Prior Fiscal Years for Which Corrective Actions Have Not Been Completed

**Appendix F:** Significant Non-monetary Recommendations from Prior Fiscal Years for Which Corrective Actions Have Not Been Completed

**Appendix G:** Open Recommendations and Reports with Unimplemented Recommendations

**Appendix H:** Management Decisions Made Regarding Reports Issued in a Previous Reporting Period

**Appendix I:** Closed Audits and Investigations Not Available to the Public

**Appendix J:** *Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 Compliance*

**Appendix K:** Instances of Social Security Administration Interference or Refusal to Provide Information

**Appendix L:** Peer Reviews

**Appendix M:** Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees Where Allegations of Misconduct Were Substantiated



## Reporting Requirements

This report meets the requirements of the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, and includes information as mandated by Congress.<sup>1</sup>

Section	Requirement	Page(s)
5(a)(1)	A description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations of the establishment and associated reports and recommendations for corrective action made by the Office	20-24
5(a)(2)	An identification of each recommendation made before the reporting period, for which corrective action has not been completed, including the potential cost savings associated with the recommendation	44-52
5(a)(3)	A summary of significant investigations closed during the reporting period	4; 9-17; 29-30
5(a)(4)	An identification of the total number of convictions during the reporting period resulting from investigations	5
5(a)(5)	Information regarding each audit, inspection, or evaluation report issued during the reporting period, including— A. a listing of each audit, inspection, or evaluation; B. if applicable, the total dollar value of questioned costs (including a separate category for the dollar value of questioned or unsupported costs) and the dollar value of recommendations that funds be put to better use, including whether a management decision had been made by the end of the reporting period	39-43
5(a)(6)	Information regarding any management decision made during the reporting period with respect to any audit, inspection, or evaluation issued during a previous reporting period	61
5(a)(7)	The information described under section 804(b) of the <i>Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996</i> (Public Law 104–208, §101(f) [title VIII], 31 U.S.C. 3512 note)	63
5(a)(8)	A. An appendix containing the results of any peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General during the reporting period; or B. If no peer review has been conducted within that reporting period, a statement identifying the date of the last peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General	65
5(a)(9)	A list of any outstanding recommendations from any peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General that have not been fully implemented, including a statement describing the status of the implementation and why implementation is not complete	65

1. Effective December 27, 2022, the *Inspector General Act of 1978* was reorganized and codified as 5 U.S.C. §§ 401–424; the requirements for the Semiannual Report to Congress appear in 5 U.S.C. § 405. Section 5273 of the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023*, however, amended the semiannual reporting requirements as they had appeared in section 5 of the *Inspector General Act* prior to the codification. These revisions are not yet codified in 5 U.S.C. § 405 and instead appear in the statutory notes as amendments not shown in the text.

Section	Requirement	Page(s)
5(a)(10)	A list of any peer reviews conducted by the Inspector General of another Office of the Inspector General during the reporting period, including a list of any outstanding recommendations made from any previous peer review (including any peer review conducted before the reporting period) that remain outstanding or have not been fully implemented	65
5(a)(11)	Statistical tables showing— <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. the total number of investigative reports issued during the reporting period;</li> <li>B. the total number of persons referred to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution during the reporting period;</li> <li>C. the total number of persons referred to State and local prosecuting authorities during the reporting period; and</li> <li>D. the total number of indictments and criminal informations during the reporting period that resulted from any prior referral to prosecuting authorities</li> </ul>	4-5
5(a)(12)	A description of the metrics used for developing the data for the statistical tables under paragraph 5(a)(11)	4-5
5(a)(13)	A report on each investigation conducted by the Office where allegations of misconduct were substantiated involving a senior Government employee or senior official (as defined by the Office) if the establishment does not have senior government employees, which shall include— <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. the name of the senior government employee, if already made public by the Office; and</li> <li>B. a detailed description of—               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. the facts and circumstances of the investigation; and</li> <li>ii. the status and disposition of the matter, including—                   <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>I. if the matter was referred to the Department of Justice, the date of the referral; and</li> <li>II. if the Department of Justice declined the referral, the date of the declination</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul>	66
5(a)(14)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. A detailed description of any instance of whistleblower retaliation, including information about the official found to have engaged in retaliation; and</li> <li>B. What, if any, consequences the establishment actually imposed to hold the official described in subparagraph (A) accountable</li> </ul>	17
5(a)(15)	Information related to interference by the establishment, including— <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. a detailed description of any attempt by the establishment to interfere with the independence of the Office, including—               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. with budget constraints designed to limit the capabilities of the Office; and</li> <li>ii. incidents where the establishment has resisted or objected to oversight activities of the Office or restricted or significantly delayed access to information, including the justification of the establishment for such action; and</li> </ul> </li> <li>B. a summary of each report made to the head of the establishment under section 6(c)(2) during the reporting period</li> </ul>	64

Section	Requirement	Page(s)
5(a)(16)	Detailed descriptions of the particular circumstances of each— A. inspection, evaluation, and audit conducted by the Office that is closed and was not disclosed to the public; and B. investigation conducted by the Office involving a senior Government employee that is closed and was not disclosed to the public	62

## Reports with Questioned Costs

Questioned costs include costs that we determined, based on our audits: (1) violated a provision of a law, regulation, contract, grant, cooperative agreement, or other agreement or document governing the expenditure of funds; (2) were not supported by adequate documentation; or (3) were unnecessary or unreasonable. Disallowed costs are those questioned costs identified through our audits that the Social Security Administration management has sustained or agreed should not be charged to the government. Section 5(a)(5)(B) of the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, requires that we report the total dollar value of questioned costs (including a separate category for the dollar value of unsupported costs), including whether a management decision had been made by the end of the reporting period.

<b>Reports with Questioned Costs for April 1, 2024, through September 30, 2024</b>				
	<b>Number of Reports</b>	<b>Dollar Value Supported</b>	<b>Dollar Value Unsupported</b>	<b>Total Questioned Costs</b>
A. For which no management decision had been made by the commencement of the reporting period.	19	\$2,177,315,027	\$397,644	\$2,177,712,671
B. Which were issued during the reporting period. <sup>1</sup>	7	\$1,368,774,227	\$0	\$1,368,774,227
<b>Subtotal (A + B)</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>\$3,546,089,254</b>	<b>\$397,644</b>	<b>\$3,546,486,898</b>
<b>Less:</b>				
C. For which a management decision was made during the reporting period.				
i. Dollar value of disallowed costs. <sup>2</sup>	9	\$341,532,555	\$189,892	\$341,722,447
ii. Dollar value of costs not disallowed. <sup>2</sup>	4	\$738,914,695	\$207,752	\$739,122,447
<b>Subtotal (i + ii)</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>\$1,080,447,250</b>	<b>\$397,644</b>	<b>\$1,080,844,894</b>
D. For which no management decision had been made by the end of the reporting period. <sup>2</sup>	18	\$2,465,642,004	\$0	\$2,465,642,004

1. See [Appendix D](#) for a detailed listing of all reports issued, including reports with questioned costs.

2. Some reports have multiple monetary recommendations with different decisions on the dollar values and are accounted for as follows: (1) two reports have one recommendation recorded in C.i. and C.ii; (2) two reports have one recommendation recorded in C.i. and two recommendations recorded in D; and (3) one report has one recommendation recorded in C.ii. and three recommendations recorded in D.

## Reports with Funds Put to Better Use

Funds put to better use are funds that the Social Security Administration could use more efficiently if it took action to implement our recommendations. Section 5(a)(5)(B) of the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, also requires that we report the dollar value of recommendations that funds be put to better use, including whether a management decision had been made by the end of the reporting period.

<b>Reports with Funds Put to Better Use for April 1, 2024, through September 30, 2024</b>		
	<b>Number of Reports</b>	<b>Dollar Value</b>
A. For which no management decision had been made by the commencement of the reporting period.	11	\$1,673,110,940
B. Which were issued during the reporting period. <sup>1</sup>	12	\$10,494,338,993
<b>Subtotal (A + B)</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>\$12,167,449,933</b>
<b>Less:</b>		
C. For which a management decision was made during the reporting period.		
i. Dollar value of costs agreed to by management. <sup>2</sup>	5	\$31,831,389
ii. Dollar value of costs not agreed to by management.	0	\$0
<b>Subtotal (i + ii)</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>\$31,831,389</b>
D. For which no management decision had been made by the end of the reporting period. <sup>2</sup>	20	\$12,135,618,544

1. See [Appendix D](#) for a detailed listing of all reports issued, including reports with funds put to better use.

2. Some reports have multiple monetary recommendations with different decisions on the dollar values and are accounted for as follows: (1) one report has one recommendation recorded in C.i. and two recommendations recorded in D.; and (2) one report has one recommendation recorded in C.i. and one recommendation recorded in D.

## Office of Audit Reports Issued

We issued 41 audit products during this reporting period. *The Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, requires that we identify reports with non-monetary findings, questioned costs, and funds put to better use. Audit reports may be listed more than once in the charts that follow.

Audit reports are available on our website at [this link](#).

April 1, 2024, through September 30, 2024

### Reports with Non-Monetary Findings

Report Title	Report Number	Issue Date	Management Challenge(s) <sup>1</sup>	Management Decision <sup>2</sup>
Fiscal Year 2023 Periodic Assessment of the Social Security Administration's Charge Card Programs	032314	04/03/2024	N/A <sup>3</sup>	N/A
Using Medicare Claim Data to Identify Deceased Beneficiaries Aged 80 to 89	042301	05/08/2024	Improper Payments	N/A
Customer Wait Times in the Social Security Administration's Field Offices and Card Centers	152307	05/17/2024	Service Delivery	Yes
The Social Security Administration's Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 in Fiscal Year 2023	152309	05/24/2024	N/A <sup>4</sup>	Yes
Office of the Inspector General Audit Recommendations that Had Not Been Implemented as of March 22, 2024	002406	05/29/2024	N/A <sup>5</sup>	N/A
Social Security Administration's Policies Related to Outside Employment	022314	06/03/2024	Service Delivery	N/A
Single Audit of the State of Louisiana for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2023	772401	06/11/2024	Disability Programs	Yes
Single Audit of the State of New Hampshire for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2023	772402	06/11/2024	Disability Programs	Yes
Single Audit of the State of Texas for the Fiscal Year Ended August 31, 2023	772403	06/11/2024	Disability Programs	Yes

1. This column identifies the management challenge(s) for each issued audit report. For a list of the six management challenges, see the [Audit Overview](#) section of this report. These challenges apply to the audit reports in all tables in this appendix.

2. This column identifies whether the Social Security Administration made a decision on both the text and dollars associated with the report's recommendation(s). "Yes" indicates that there was a management decision made regarding all recommendations in the report. "No" indicates that a management decision was not made regarding at least one recommendation in the report.

3. This was a mandatory report.

4. This was a mandatory report.

5. This was a mandatory report.



April 1, 2024, through September 30, 2024

## Reports with Non-Monetary Findings

Report Title	Report Number	Issue Date	Management Challenge(s) <sup>1</sup>	Management Decision <sup>2</sup>
Single Audit of the State of New Jersey for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2023	772404	06/12/2024	Disability Programs	Yes
Widow(er)s at or Beyond Full Retirement Age	032316	07/03/2024	Improper Payments	N/A
Spouses Subject to Age Reduction and Government Pension Offset	052407	07/23/2024	Improper Payments, Service Delivery	N/A
Preventing, Detecting, and Recovering Improper Payments	072401	07/25/2024	Improper Payments	N/A
Oversight of Medical Examinations for Disability Claims	012313	07/29/2024	Disability Programs, Service Delivery	N/A
Follow-up Review of Numident Death Information Not Included on the Death Master File	062301	07/31/2024	Improper Payments	Yes
Social Security Administration's Enterprise Risk Management	022323	08/05/2024	Service Delivery	Yes
Security of the Business Services Online	022329	08/07/2024	Information Security, Modernize IT, Service Delivery	Yes
Security of Common Control Providers	142319	08/28/2024	Information Security	Yes
Development and Implementation of the Debt Management Product	142313	09/25/2024	Modernize IT	Yes
Security Assessment and Authorization Process	A-14-21-51093	09/25/2024	Information Security, Modernize IT	Yes
The Social Security Administration's Information Security Program and Practices for Fiscal Year 2024	142401	09/26/2024	Information Security	N/A
Legacy Systems Modernization and Movement to Cloud Services	142312	09/26/2024	Modernize IT	Yes
Earnings Evaluations for Disability Claimants	A-07-21-51017	09/26/2024	Disability Programs	Yes
Representative Payee Reviews and Educational Visits	A-13-17-50195	09/26/2024	Service Delivery	Yes

April 1, 2024, through September 30, 2024

## Reports with Non-Monetary Findings

Report Title	Report Number	Issue Date	Management Challenge(s) <sup>1</sup>	Management Decision <sup>2</sup>
Controls over Employees' Premium Pay	152404	09/27/2024	Human Capital Management	N/A

April 1, 2024, through September 30, 2024

## Reports with Questioned Costs

Report Title	Report Number	Issue Date	Management Challenge(s)	Dollar Value	Management Decision
Impact of Undetected Marriages on Social Security Administration Payments	012317	04/17/2024	Improper Payments	\$259,808,648	No
Disability Payments to Beneficiaries or Recipients Receiving Illinois or Texas Workers' Compensation Benefits	A-06-20-50922	05/17/2024	Improper Payments	\$28,594,221	No
Match of State Department Death Information Against Social Security Administration Records	062313	05/31/2024	Improper Payments	\$37,816,696	No
Cross-referred Social Security Numbers	062308	07/31/2024	Improper Payments	\$146,561,527	No
Follow-up on the Accuracy of the Social Security Administration's Manual Billing Process to Collect Medicare Premiums	012310	09/03/2024	Improper Payments, Service Delivery	\$166,561,112	No
Supplemental Security Income Recipients who Under-report Financial Account Balances	A-02-21-51028	09/24/2024	Improper Payments	\$717,569,960	Yes
Match of National Missing and Unidentified Persons System Information Against Social Security Administration Records	062402	09/25/2024	Improper Payments	\$11,862,063	No
<b>Total</b>				<b>\$1,368,774,227</b>	

April 1, 2024, through September 30, 2024

## Reports with Funds Put to Better Use

Report Title	Report Number	Issue Date	Management Challenge(s)	Dollar Value	Management Decision
Match of State Department Death Information Against Social Security Administration Records	062313	05/31/2024	Improper Payments	\$4,926,099	No
Reducing Processing Centers' Pending Actions	022313	06/28/2024	Service Delivery	\$387,566,942	No
Challenges in Recovering Supplemental Security Income Overpayments	A-07-21-51018	07/30/2024	Improper Payments	\$7,264,709,480	No
Cross-referred Social Security Numbers	062308	07/31/2024	Improper Payments	\$22,865,204	No
The Social Security Administration's Processing of Priority Cases	A-04-21-51033	08/08/2024	Disability Programs	\$33,960	No
Disabled Beneficiaries Receiving Direct Payments Who Previously Had Representative Payees	052403	09/17/2024	Improper Payments, Service Delivery	\$887,332,649	No
Discrepancies in the Electronic Representative Payee System	052402	09/18/2024	Improper Payments, Service Delivery	\$22,784,102	No
Disability Waiting Period Exclusions	072304	09/20/2024	Disability Programs	\$13,900,058	No
Unclaimed Social Security Administration Assets Held by States and the District of Columbia	062329	09/24/2024	Improper Payments	\$933,414	No
Match of National Missing and Unidentified Persons System Information Against Social Security Administration Records	062402	09/25/2024	Improper Payments	\$2,134,764	No
Supplemental Security Income Ineligibility Determinations and Payment Suspensions Based on Failure to Provide Information	A-02-22-51135	09/25/2024	Disability Programs	\$647,273,628	No

April 1, 2024, through September 30, 2024

## Reports with Funds Put to Better Use

Report Title	Report Number	Issue Date	Management Challenge(s)	Dollar Value	Management Decision
Representative Payees Not in the Electronic Representative Payee System	052401	09/25/2024	Improper Payments, Service Delivery	\$1,239,878,693	No
<b>Total</b>				<b>\$10,494,338,993</b>	

# Significant Monetary Recommendations from Prior Fiscal Years for Which Corrective Actions Have Not Been Completed

**25**

Unimplemented Significant Monetary Recommendations Fiscal Years 2017 – 2023 (through September 30)

**TOTALING \$5,032,327,812**

Report Title, Report Number, Issue Date  
Unimplemented Recommendation(s), Dollar Value(s)

## ■ Fiscal Year 2023

### Allegations of Representative Payees' Misuse of Benefits

(A-09-19-50797 – issued 9/29/23)

**\$1,417,220 Funds Put to Better Use**

**Recommendation 1:** Take corrective action for the 135 allegations we identified in all 3 samples of our audit.

**\$184,779,799 Funds Put to Better Use**

**Recommendation 2:** Based on the results of its actions for our sampled allegations, take corrective action for the remaining population of 14,777 beneficiaries whose allegations were still pending.

### Manually Processed Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Benefit Termination Actions

(A-07-21-51043 – issued 9/27/23)

**\$53,362,441 Questioned Costs**

**Recommendation 2:** Establish, and instruct employees to use, a centralized resource with preferred query tools and worksheets to assist employees in obtaining all beneficiary entitlement information necessary to accurately process manual termination actions.

### Follow-up Review of Self-employment Earnings Removed from the Master Earnings File

(A-06-21-51020 – issued 9/26/23)

**\$67,137,261 Funds Put to Better Use**

**Recommendation 3:** Delete all disclaimed self-employment income for Tax Years 2012 through 2019 that remain in the earnings suspense file unless the earnings were reported with a name that clearly differs from that on the earnings record to which they were originally posted.

## Statutory Benefit Continuation for Disability Beneficiaries

(A-07-21-51105 – issued 9/25/23)

**\$297,689,888 Questioned Costs**

**Recommendation 2:** Create additional controls to ensure the Agency issues Statutory Benefit Continuation (SBC) payments when due, especially for beneficiaries whose appeals the Appeals Council has remanded back to the Administrative Law Judges.

**\$197,448,587 Questioned Costs**

**Recommendation 4:** Improve systems to ensure medical cessation dates are recorded correctly on Supplemental Security Income records.

**\$68,446,451 Questioned Costs**

**Recommendation 5:** Improve systems to ensure SBC payments to Disability Insurance beneficiaries and auxiliary beneficiaries are stopped in accordance with applicable statutes, regulations, and policy.

## Workers' Compensation Lump-sum Settlements

(012308 – issued 9/21/23)

**\$359,839,314 Questioned Costs**

**Recommendation 9:** Review the 193,950 workers' compensation cases in our population to identify and correct the estimated 151,281 cases with errors.

## The Social Security Administration's Controls over Modernized Development Worksheets

(A-02-22-51157 – issued 9/18/23)

**\$841,409,257 Questioned Costs**

**Recommendation 2:** Implement controls to ensure employees take all actions requested before they close Modernized Development Worksheets.

## Fiscal Year 2022

### Work Review Determinations for Disabled Beneficiaries

(A-07-21-51012 – issued 9/29/22)

**\$456,252,223 Questioned Costs**

**Recommendation 2:** In the system that will replace eWork, incorporate controls to increase the accurate processing of work continuing disability reviews (CDR) and functionality to expand automation of work CDR processing and effectuation, including those involving multiple entitlements, reducing the need for manual actions.

## Spouses and Widow(er)s Who Have Unverified Government Pensions

(A-13-17-50161 – issued 8/24/22)

**\$9,956 Questioned Costs**  
**\$118,378 Funds Put to Better Use**

**Recommendation 3:** Implement an internal control that prevents a future pension entitlement date on the Master Beneficiary Record (MBR) of more than 1 year in the future.

**\$19,383,880 Questioned Costs**  
**\$9,779,480 Funds Put to Better Use**

**Recommendation 4<sup>1</sup>:** Identify and correct the future pension entitlement dates on the MBR for the estimated 5,434 beneficiaries who have entitlement dates that do not comply with policy or are not recorded on the MBR.

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## Incorrect Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Benefit Payment Computations that Resulted in Overpayments

(A-07-18-50674 – issued 5/26/22)

**\$368,326,080 Questioned Costs**

**Recommendation 1:** Improve Agency systems to automate benefit computations and reduce the need for manual processing.

## Deceased Beneficiaries in Suspended Payment Status

(A-08-19-50800 – issued 11/22/21)

**\$48,423,411 Questioned Costs**  
**\$7,983,516 Funds Put to Better Use**

**Recommendation 3:** Verify and post death information, where appropriate, for the remaining beneficiaries in the State Death population.

**\$14,130,460 Questioned Costs**  
**\$7,993,948 Funds Put to Better Use**

**Recommendation 4:** Instruct technicians to take appropriate actions on the remaining beneficiaries in the Death Suspense population.

**\$149,718,615 Questioned Costs**  
**\$16,709,589 Funds Put to Better Use**

**Recommendation 5<sup>2</sup>:** Establish systems criteria to identify Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance beneficiaries in Address Suspense who are likely deceased, such as identifying beneficiaries suspended for prolonged periods who do not have activity on any Social Security Administration (SSA) records since their suspension. Once established, SSA should update policy to instruct technicians to search for death information.

1. SSA considers this recommendation implemented; however, it has not provided sufficient information to enable our audit team to verify that it has fully implemented it.
2. SSA considers this recommendation implemented; however, it has not provided sufficient information to enable our audit team to verify that it has fully implemented it.

## ■ Fiscal Year 2021

### Overpayments with Recovery Agreements that Will Extend Beyond 2049

(A-07-19-50775 – issued 9/28/21)

**\$1,240,312,343 Funds Put to Better Use**

**Recommendation:** Establish consistent criteria to ensure it identifies existing overpayments for which the Recovery of Overpayments, Accounting and Reporting system deleted a portion of the overpayment balance as part of a plan to address the untracked debt amount when it implements a solution to the Recovery of Overpayments, Accounting and Reporting system limitation.

### Follow-up on Underpayments Payable to Terminated Old-age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Beneficiaries

(A-09-19-50848 – issued 12/11/20)<sup>3</sup>

**\$142,298,569 Questioned Costs  
\$6,706,311 Funds Put to Better Use**

**Recommendation 3:** Identify and take action on the population of terminated beneficiaries with underpayments payable to eligible beneficiaries and individuals.

## ■ Fiscal Year 2020

### The Social Security Administration's Rejection of State Electronic Death Registration Reports

(A-08-18-50499 – issued 9/21/20)<sup>4</sup>

**\$84,615 Questioned Costs  
\$62,943 Funds Put to Better Use**

**Recommendation 3:** Include a Numident match in the Death Information Processing System, or similar process, to assess Online Verification System discrepancies before rejecting an Electronic Death Registration report.

## ■ Fiscal Year 2019

### Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Beneficiaries with Overpayments on Suspended and Terminated Records

(A-07-18-50317 – issued 9/25/19)

**\$17,976,178 Questioned Costs**

**Recommendation 2:** Establish a process to identify overpayments that exist on suspended or terminated Social Security numbers that the Re-entitled Beneficiaries process does not detect, so the Agency can transfer and recover them via benefit withholding.

3. SSA considers this recommendation implemented; however, OIG disagrees.

4. SSA considers this recommendation implemented; however, OIG disagrees.



### Recovery of Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Overpayments When a Contingently Liable Beneficiary Stops Receiving Benefits

(A-04-18-50651 – issued 5/15/19)<sup>5</sup>

**\$15,101,940 Questioned Costs**

**Recommendation 2:** Review and take action to remove the overpayment balance from the 4,690 terminated contingently liable beneficiaries and transfer the debt balance to the original debtor for an immediate payment of the overpayment or seek recovery through additional debt collection tools.

## ■ Fiscal Year 2018

### The Social Security Administration's Use of Administrative Tolerance Waivers

(A-04-16-50145 – issued 8/1/18)

**\$12,568,202 Questioned Costs**

**Recommendation:** Establish controls in the new Debt Management Product, as part of its Debt Management modernization initiative, that ensure technicians can only use the administrative tolerance waiver for overpayments allowable under the provision.

### Higher Benefits for Dually Entitled Widow(er)s Had They Delayed Applying for Retirement Benefits

(A-09-18-50559 – issued 2/14/18)<sup>6</sup>

**\$485,911 Questioned Costs  
\$36,300 Funds Put to Better Use**

**Recommendation 1:** Take action, as appropriate, for the 41 beneficiaries identified by our audit.

**\$131,332,025 Questioned Costs  
\$9,811,164 Funds Put to Better Use**

**Recommendation 2:** Evaluate the results for the 41 beneficiaries in our sample and determine whether SSA should review the remaining population of 13,514 beneficiaries.

## ■ Fiscal Year 2017

### Widow(er)s Eligible for an Earlier Initial Month of Entitlement

(A-09-17-50187 – issued 8/7/17)<sup>7</sup>

**\$285,191,557 Questioned Costs**

**Recommendation 2:** Determine the feasibility of reviewing the remaining population of widow(er)s who may be eligible for additional months of benefits before their application filing date and could have chosen an earlier initial month of entitlement.

5. SSA considers this recommendation implemented; however, OIG disagrees.

6. SSA considers these recommendations implemented; however, OIG disagrees.

7. SSA considers this recommendation implemented; however, OIG disagrees.

# Significant Non-monetary Recommendations from Prior Fiscal Years for Which Corrective Actions Have Not Been Completed



Unimplemented Significant  
Non-monetary Recommendations  
Fiscal Years 2017 – 2023 (through September 30)

Report Title, Report Number, Issue Date  
Unimplemented Recommendation(s)

## ■ Fiscal Year 2023

### Government Pension Data for the Windfall Elimination Provision and Government Pension Offset Determinations

(A-13-20-50970 – issued 9/28/23)

**Recommendation:** Determine whether to seek legislation to amend the Internal Revenue Code to permit the Internal Revenue Service to share with the Social Security Administration (SSA) noncovered pension data for all Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance beneficiaries.

### Digital Identity in my Social Security

(142307 – issued 9/26/23)

**Recommendation 1:** Comply with the National Institute of Standards and Technology guidance to collect, validate, and verify identity evidence during the identity proofing process for all users before allowing access to my Social Security.

### Processing Non-citizens' Original Social Security Numbers Electronically Through Enumeration Programs

(A-08-22-51136 – issued 9/20/23)

**Recommendation 1:** Cross-reference the 1,185 non-citizens' records with multiple Social Security numbers (SSN). (We provided these SSNs under separate cover.)

### The Social Security Administration's Determinations of Supplemental Security Income Recipients' Real Properties

(022328 – issued 9/1/23)

**Recommendation 2:** Add system controls to ensure employees review for possible prior Non-Home Real Property ownership for properties that may have been owned or sold within the look-back period and whether the sales are subject to transfers of resource rules.

**Recommendation 5:** Add system controls to ensure living arrangements are reviewed and updated for changes during redeterminations if information from property searches conflict with other information in SSA records.

### Numberholders Age 100 or Older Who Did Not Have Death Information on the Numident

(A-06-21-51022 – issued 7/31/23)

**Recommendation 1:** Use the death information already in its records to input death information on 2.5 million numberholders' Numident records.

### Manual Processes for Resource-intensive Workloads

(A-07-19-50882 – issued 7/21/23)

**Recommendation 1:** Implement measures to uniformly assess cost savings, effectiveness, and return on investment for automation enhancements, including bots, that affect manual workloads.

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### The Social Security Administration's Oversight of Beneficiaries Who Receive Benefits Under the Direct Express® Debit Card Program

(A-04-20-50977, 6/22/23)

**Recommendation 1:** Develop a standardized statement for SSA employees to confirm the beneficiary or representative payee's intent to enroll into the Direct Express® Debit Card program and explain Comerica Bank is the financial institution that will mail the debit card and provide instructions on activating the card. The standardized statement could also include such information as the Direct Express® customer service telephone number.

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## ■ Fiscal Year 2022

### Numident Death Alerts

(A-06-21-51086 – issued 9/30/22)<sup>1</sup>

**Recommendation 2:** Establish a timeliness goal for resolution of Numident death alerts.

**Recommendation 4:** Establish management controls to periodically ensure Numident death alerts are resolved in a timely manner.

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### The Social Security Administration's Enumeration Services During the COVID-19 Pandemic

(A-15-21-51015 – issued 9/30/22)<sup>2</sup>

**Recommendation 2:** Update quality control reviews to include comparison of the SSN Application Process inputs to an applicant-submitted Form SS-5 and evidentiary documents and provide feedback to the technicians who made input errors (such as race and ethnicity) or did not use the appropriate evidentiary documents.

**Recommendation 3:** Revise enumeration policy to include clear instructions for when Form SSA-5002 is required and how to properly document the form.

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### The Social Security Administration's Oversight of Disability Determination Services' Financial Management

(A-15-21-51117 – issued 9/20/22)<sup>3</sup>

**Recommendation 1:** Revise the Code of Federal Regulations and/or the Program Operations Manual System to provide (a) detailed guidance related to financial oversight of the Disability Determination Services (DDS) and (b) specific instruction to the DDSs to uniformly carry out their financial management responsibilities. In addition, SSA should specify what actions it will take (in compliance with the *Social Security Act*) to remedy DDSs' recurring financial management findings and lack of fiscal control procedures.

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1. SSA considers these recommendations implemented; however, OIG disagrees.
2. SSA considers these recommendations implemented; however, OIG disagrees.
3. SSA considers this recommendation implemented; however, it has not provided sufficient information to enable our audit team to verify that it has fully implemented it.

### Agile Software Development at the Social Security Administration

(A-14-20-50947 – issued 8/24/22)<sup>4</sup>

**Recommendation 4:** Strengthen its controls to more effectively enforce implementation of the updated Agile guidance among projects and teams.

### Follow-up on Deceased Beneficiaries and Recipients with No Death Information on the Numident

(A-09-20-50936 – issued 5/4/22)<sup>5</sup>

**Recommendation 2:** Take action, as appropriate, to record death information in the Numident for the 15,714 beneficiaries identified by our current audit.

**Recommendation 3:** Take appropriate action to record death information to the Numident for the 595,514 beneficiaries identified by our prior audits.

### Students Whose Benefits Were Erroneously Terminated When They Reached Age 18

(A-09-19-50823 – issued 4/22/22)

**Recommendation 5:** Update the Title II Redesign System to ensure it generates an alert when SSA has terminated benefits to a child upon attaining age 18; however, the benefit record indicates the individual is a full-time student after they attain age 18.

## ■ Fiscal Year 2021

### The Social Security Administration's Administrative Finality Policy

(A-01-19-50859 – issued 5/28/21)

**Recommendation:** Finalize its decision on updating its administrative finality policy and execute an action plan with specific milestones to ensure any updates are implemented timely.

## ■ Fiscal Year 2020

### Miscellaneous Benefit Suspensions for Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Beneficiaries

(A-07-19-50799 – issued 9/21/20)

**Recommendation 3:** Implement controls, such as systems alerts and management reports, to identify beneficiaries in miscellaneous suspense status and ensure employees take corrective actions timely.

### Beneficiaries with Representative Payees and Earnings

(A-02-17-50143 – issued 3/5/20)

**Recommendation 4:** Revise notices sent to beneficiaries and their representative payees informing them of benefit increases due to additional earnings to include the employer(s) name, earnings amounts, a reminder to report errors to SSA, and instructions on reporting errors.

## ■ Fiscal Year 2019

### Recovery of Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Overpayments When a Contingently Liable Beneficiary Stops Receiving Benefits

(A-04-18-50651 – issued 5/15/19)

**Recommendation 3:** Establish controls to remove the outstanding debt from terminated contingently liable beneficiaries and transfer the balance to the original debtor for an immediate payment of the overpayment or seek recovery through additional debt collection tools when available.

4. SSA considers this recommendation implemented; however, OIG disagrees.

5. SSA considers these recommendations implemented; however, OIG disagrees.

## ■ Fiscal Year 2018

### Higher Benefits for Dually Entitled Widow(er)s Had They Delayed Applying for Retirement Benefits

(A-09-18-50559 – issued 2/14/18)<sup>6</sup>

**Recommendation 4:** Determine whether it should develop additional controls to ensure it informs widow(er) beneficiaries of their option to delay their application for retirement benefits.

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## ■ Fiscal Year 2017

### The Social Security Administration's Telework Program and Its Effect on Customer Service (Congressional Response Report)

(A-04-17-50267 – issued 7/12/17)<sup>7</sup>

**Recommendation 3:** Determine the effect telework has on customer wait times when a field office experiences an unusually high number of visitors.

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6. SSA considers this recommendation implemented; however, OIG disagrees.

7. SSA considers this recommendation implemented; however, OIG disagrees.

## Open Recommendations and Reports with Unimplemented Recommendations

The Social Security Administration Office of the Inspector General has open recommendations dating from fiscal year (FY) 2012. All recommendations from FYs prior to FY 2012 are closed. The chart below identifies the number of reports with unimplemented recommendations by FY and the aggregate potential cost savings of those recommendations.

### Reports Issued through March 31, 2024

Reports with Open Recommendations			
Fiscal Year	Number of Reports with Unimplemented Recommendations	Number of Unimplemented Recommendations	Dollar Value of Aggregate Potential Cost Savings
2024	2	10	\$258,535,293
2023	25	78	\$2,072,516,366
2022	15	42	\$1,311,467,904
2021	8	10	\$1,454,202,256
2020	3	3	\$147,558
2019	7	14	\$619,163,817
2018	7	9	\$171,817,193
2017	3	4	\$657,415,697
2016	3	7	\$27,974,234
2015	2	2	0
2014	5	5	\$136,153
2013	1	1	0
2012	2	2	\$133,694,565
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>\$6,707,071,036</b>

Below is additional detail for each report included in the Number of Reports column above. All audit reports are available on our website at [this link](#).

Report Title	Report Number	Issue Date	Recommendation Number	Dollar Value
The Social Security Administration's Enforcement of the Earnings Test	A-08-21-51049	2/2/2024	01	N/A
			02	N/A
			03	\$148,014,267
			04	N/A
			05	\$29,365,023
			07	\$81,069,424
			08	N/A
			09	N/A
			10	\$86,579
			Follow-up: The Social Security Administration's Implementation of Mail Procedures	042312
Allegations of Representative Payees' Misuse of Benefits*	A-09-19-50797	9/29/2023	01	\$1,417,220
			02	\$184,779,799
			05	N/A
			06	\$217,928
Government Pension Data for the Windfall Elimination Provision and Government Pension Offset Determinations*	A-13-20-50970	9/28/2023	01	N/A
Mobile Phone Security	A-14-19-50811	9/28/2023	06	N/A
			07	N/A
Ransomware Prevention and Response	142309	9/27/2023	02	N/A
			03	N/A
			04	N/A
			05	N/A
			06	N/A
			02	N/A
Security of the Web Identification, Authentication, and Access Control Systems	142311	9/27/2023	05	N/A
			06	N/A
			07	N/A
			08	N/A
			09	N/A
Whistleblower Protection for Contractors	152306	9/27/2023	03	N/A
Manually Processed Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Benefit Termination Actions*	A-07-21-51043	9/27/2023	02	\$53,362,441
			03	N/A
Windfall Offset Determinations	A-09-18-50697	9/27/2023	02	N/A
			03	N/A
			04	N/A

Report Title	Report Number	Issue Date	Recommendation Number	Dollar Value
Follow-up Review of Self-employment Earnings Removed from the Master Earnings File*	A-06-21-51020	9/26/2023	01	N/A
			02	N/A
			03	\$67,137,261
Digital Identity in my Social Security*	142307	9/26/2023	01	N/A
			02	N/A
Statutory Benefit Continuation for Disability Beneficiaries*	A-07-21-51105	9/25/2023	01	N/A
			02	\$297,689,888
			03	N/A
			04	\$197,448,587
			05	\$68,446,451
The Social Security Administration's Determinations of Supplemental Security Income Recipients' Trusts	A-02-21-51026	9/22/2023	03	N/A
			04	N/A
			05	N/A
Workers' Compensation Lump-sum Settlements*	012308	9/21/2023	01	N/A
			02	N/A
			04	\$360,073
			05	N/A
			07	N/A
			08	N/A
Dedicated Accounts for Supplemental Security Income Recipients	A-04-21-51031	9/20/2023	09	\$359,839,314
			02	N/A
			03	N/A
Processing Non-citizens' Original Social Security Numbers Electronically Through Enumeration Programs*	A-08-22-51136	9/20/2023	06	N/A
			01	N/A
			02	N/A
			03	N/A
State Workers' Compensation and Public Disability Benefits' Reverse Offset Plans' Impact on the Disability Insurance Trust Fund	A-02-19-50867	9/18/2023	04	N/A
			05	N/A
			01	N/A
			02	N/A
			03	\$408,147
The Social Security Administration's Controls over Modernized Development Worksheets*	A-02-22-51157	9/18/2023	01	N/A
			02	\$841,409,257
			03	N/A



Report Title	Report Number	Issue Date	Recommendation Number	Dollar Value
The Social Security Administration's Determinations of Supplemental Security Income Recipients' Real Properties*	022328	9/1/2023	02	N/A
			03	N/A
			04	N/A
			05	N/A
			06	N/A
Controls over the Social Security Administration's National 800-number Service During the COVID-19 Pandemic	A-02-21-51079	8/29/2023	01	N/A
			02	N/A
Funds Dedicated to Address Program Integrity and Hearings Backlog Workloads	A-15-19-50885	8/14/2023	01	N/A
			02	N/A
Numberholders Age 100 or Older Who Did Not Have Death Information on the Numident*	A-06-21-51022	7/31/2023	01	N/A
			02	N/A
			03	N/A
Manual Processes for Resource-intensive Workloads*	A-07-19-50882	7/21/2023	01	N/A
			02	N/A
			03	N/A
The Social Security Administration's Oversight of Beneficiaries Who Receive Benefits Under the Direct Express® Debit Card Program*	A-04-20-50977	6/22/2023	01	N/A
			02	N/A
			03	N/A
Edit Routines Used to Reinstate Wage Items from the Earnings Suspense File	A-03-21-51013	6/12/2023	02	N/A
			03	N/A
Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 in Fiscal Year 2022	A-15-22-51183	5/5/2023	01	N/A
			02	N/A
Numident Death Alerts*	A-06-21-51086	9/30/2022	04	N/A
			07	N/A
			02	N/A
The Social Security Administration's Enumeration Services During the COVID-19 Pandemic*	A-15-21-51015	9/30/2022	03	N/A
			05	N/A
			06	N/A
			10	N/A
			02	\$456,252,223
Work Review Determinations for Disabled Beneficiaries*	A-07-21-51012	9/29/2022	04	\$91,370,748
			05	N/A

Report Title	Report Number	Issue Date	Recommendation Number	Dollar Value
Follow-up on Controls over Special Payment Amount Overpayments for Social Security Beneficiaries	A-09-19-50794	9/29/2022	02	\$87,251,186
			03	N/A
The Social Security Administration's Challenges and Successes in Obtaining Data to Determine Eligibility and Payment Amounts	A-01-21-51029	9/23/2022	01	N/A
			02	N/A
Follow-up on Processing Internal Revenue Service Alerts for Supplemental Security Income Recipients	A-03-18-50277	9/20/2022	03	\$34,016,434
			04	N/A
The Social Security Administration's Oversight of Disability Determination Services' Financial Management*	A-15-21-51117	9/20/2022	01	N/A
			09	N/A
Agile Software Development at the Social Security Administration*	A-14-20-50947	8/24/2022	04	N/A
			08	N/A
			12	N/A
Spouses and Widow(er)s Who Have Unverified Government Pensions*	A-13-17-50161	8/24/2022	03	\$128,334
			04	\$29,163,360
Incorrect Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Benefit Payment Computations that Resulted in Overpayments*	A-07-18-50674	5/26/2022	01	\$368,326,080
			01	N/A
The Social Security Administration's Mailing Process During the Pandemic	A-08-21-51115	5/13/2022	02	N/A
			03	N/A
			08	N/A
			08	N/A
The Social Security Administration's Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 in Fiscal Year 2021	A-15-21-51121	5/11/2022	01	N/A
Follow-up on Deceased Beneficiaries and Recipients with No Death Information on the Numident*	A-09-20-50936	5/4/2022	01	N/A
			02	N/A
			03	N/A
Students Whose Benefits Were Erroneously Terminated When They Reached Age 18*	A-09-19-50823	4/22/2022	04	N/A
			05	N/A

Report Title	Report Number	Issue Date	Recommendation Number	Dollar Value
Deceased Beneficiaries in Suspended Payment Status*	A-08-19-50800	11/22/2021	02	N/A
			03	\$56,406,927
			04	\$22,124,408
			05	\$166,428,204
			06	N/A
			07	N/A
			09	N/A
Overpayments with Recovery Agreements that Will Extend Beyond 2049*	A-07-19-50775	9/28/2021	01	\$1,240,312,343
The Social Security Administration's Processing of Misuse Allegations of Individual Representative Payees	A-13-18-50712	6/14/2021	04	\$106,435
			06	\$2,038,969
System Alerts for Beneficiaries Identified by the Delinquent Debt Trigger File	A-07-18-50743	6/9/2021	01	\$36,806,243
The Social Security Administration's Administrative Finality Policy*	A-01-19-50859	5/28/2021	01	N/A
Follow-up on Underpayments Payable to Terminated Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Beneficiaries*	A-09-19-50848	12/11/2020	03	\$149,004,880
			04	N/A
Follow-up on Disabled Supplemental Security Income Recipients Potentially Eligible for Childhood Disability Benefits	A-13-18-50714	12/10/2020	05	N/A
Supplemental Security Income Recipients Denied Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Benefits Based on Lack of Technical Evidence	A-05-18-50654	11/30/2020	03	N/A
Social Security Administration Beneficiaries Eligible for Total and Permanent Disability Federal Student Loan Discharge	A-06-17-50281	11/9/2020	01	\$25,933,386
Miscellaneous Benefit Suspensions for Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Beneficiaries*	A-07-19-50799	9/21/2020	03	N/A
The Social Security Administration's Rejection of State Electronic Death Registration Reports*	A-08-18-50499	9/21/2020	03	\$147,558
Beneficiaries with Representative Payees and Earnings*	A-02-17-50143	3/5/2020	04	N/A
Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Beneficiaries with Overpayments on Suspended and Terminated Records*	A-07-18-50317	9/25/2019	02	\$17,976,178

Report Title	Report Number	Issue Date	Recommendation Number	Dollar Value
Overpayments Pending Collection for Miscellaneous Reasons	A-04-18-50546	9/24/2019	03	N/A
			04	N/A
The Social Security Administration's Controls for Identifying Potentially Fraudulent Internet Claims	A-09-18-50655	9/13/2019	07	N/A
Supplemental Security Income Underpayments Due Deceased Recipients	A-06-18-50608	9/10/2019	02	\$467,994,323
			03	N/A
Follow-up: Aged Beneficiaries Whose Benefits Have Been Suspended for Address, Whereabouts Unknown, or Foreign Enforcement	A-09-16-50077	8/6/2019	02	\$1,068,642
			03	\$114,353,897
			04	N/A
			05	N/A
Recovery of Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Overpayments When a Contingently Liable Beneficiary Stops Receiving Benefits*	A-04-18-50651	5/15/2019	01	\$2,668,837
			02	\$15,101,940
			03	N/A
Supplemental Security Income Underpayments	A-15-18-50612	12/28/2018	01	N/A
Effectiveness of the Social Security Administration's Medicare Non-utilization Project	A-08-17-50261	9/19/2018	02	\$17,583,591
Institutionalized Beneficiaries Who Have Earnings	A-02-17-50140	8/20/2018	03	N/A
The Social Security Administration's Use of Administrative Tolerance Waivers*	A-04-16-50145	8/1/2018	01	\$12,568,202
Manual Adjustments to Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Overpayments	A-07-18-50294	4/9/2018	04	N/A
Undeliverable Social Security Number Cards	A-15-17-50279	4/2/2018	06	N/A
Higher Benefits for Dually Entitled Widow(er)s Had They Delayed Applying for Retirement Benefits*	A-09-18-50559	2/14/2018	01	\$522,211
			02	\$141,143,189
			04	N/A
Customer Wait Times in the Social Security Administration's Field Offices	A-04-18-50260	2/6/2018	02	N/A
Widow(er)s Eligible for an Earlier Initial Month of Entitlement*	A-09-17-50187	8/7/2017	01	\$261,821
			02	\$285,191,557
The Social Security Administration's Telework Program and Its Effect on Customer Service (Congressional Response Report)	A-04-17-50267	7/12/2017	03	N/A

Report Title	Report Number	Issue Date	Recommendation Number	Dollar Value
Individual Representative Payees Who Do Not Have a Social Security Number in the Social Security Administration's Payment Records	A-09-16-50159	2/17/2017	02	\$371,962,319
The Social Security Administration's Plan to Achieve Self-Support Program	A-08-16-50030	9/27/2016	01	N/A
			02	N/A
			03	N/A
Households With Multiple Children Receiving Supplemental Security Income Payments Because of Mental Impairments	A-08-14-14098	3/2/2016	01	N/A
Higher Retirement Benefits Payable to Families of Disabled Beneficiaries	A-09-14-34080	2/2/2016	01	\$537,737
			02	\$27,436,497
			03	N/A
Supplemental Security Income Overpayments Pending a Collection Determination by the Social Security Administration	A-07-15-15030	9/22/2015	04	N/A
Fraud Risk Performance Audit of the Social Security Administration's Disability Programs	A-15-15-25002	4/29/2015	04	N/A
Auxiliary Beneficiaries Who Do Not Have Their Own Social Security Number	A-01-14-14036	9/29/2014	02	\$136,153
Payments to Individuals with Deaths Reported in California from 1980 to 1987	A-06-14-21416	8/14/2014	02	N/A
Supplemental Security Income Recipients Who Had Not Cashed Their Checks Within 1 Year	A-09-13-23023	4/7/2014	04	N/A
Improper Use of Children's Social Security Numbers	A-03-12-21269	3/31/2014	03	N/A
Supplemental Security Income Telephone Wage Reporting	A-15-12-11233	2/6/2014	02	N/A
Direct Deposit Changes Initiated Through Financial Institutions and the Social Security Administration's Internet and Automated 800-Number Applications	A-14-12-21271	12/20/2012	08	N/A
Beneficiaries Who Had Not Cashed their Social Security Checks Within 1 Year	A-09-10-20133	7/19/2012	01	\$133,694,565
Title II Deceased Beneficiaries Who Do Not Have Death Information on the Numident	A-09-11-21171	7/9/2012	01	N/A

\*Denotes that report contains significant unimplemented recommendation as reported in [Appendix E](#) or [Appendix F](#).

## Management Decisions Made Regarding Reports Issued in a Previous Reporting Period

During this period, the Social Security Administration (SSA) made management decisions associated with nine different reports that had been issued during a previous reporting period (prior to April 1, 2024). Reports included in this appendix had one or more recommendations for which SSA had not previously made a management decision. SSA has now made a decision on all recommendations associated with these reports.

Some recommendations associated with these reports may still be considered open and unimplemented since making a management decision does not equate to taking final action to close out the recommendation.

Report Number	Report Title	Report Date	Recommendation Number	Date of SSA Decision	Dollar Value of Recommendation
A-09-19-50848	Follow-up on Underpayments Payable to Terminated Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Beneficiaries	12/11/2020	03	8/14/2024	\$149,004,880
A-01-13-23095	Social Security Administration's Application of the Retirement Insurance Benefit Limitation and Reduced Widows Benefit Policy	6/4/2021	01	7/17/2024	\$31,324,688
A-13-18-50712	The Social Security Administration's Processing of Misuse Allegations of Individual Representative Payees	6/14/2021	06	9/20/2024	\$2,038,969
A-08-19-50800	Deceased Beneficiaries in Suspended Payment Status	11/22/2021	05	8/20/2024	\$166,428,204
A-07-21-51012	Work Review Determinations for Disabled Beneficiaries	9/29/2022	01	5/30/2024	\$5,661,210
A-06-21-51086	Numident Death Alerts	9/30/2022	01	6/20/2024	\$18,736,925
022328	The Social Security Administration's Determinations of Supplemental Security Income Recipients' Real Properties	9/1/2023	01	4/17/2024	\$184,392
A-02-21-51026	The Social Security Administration's Determinations of Supplemental Security Income Recipients' Trusts	9/22/2023	01	5/2/2024	\$213,252
012312	Auxiliary Beneficiaries Who Do Not Have Their Own, or Have an Incorrect, Social Security Numbers	10/13/2023	01	9/30/2024	\$2,619,544

## Closed Audits and Investigations Not Available to the Public

### ■ *Office of Audit*

We issued three audits during this period that were not made available to the public. These reports contain information that, if not protected, could result in adverse effects to the Social Security Administration's information systems. To maintain transparency, we issued summaries for each of the reports that discuss findings and recommendations at a high-level and are appropriate for public distribution. The list of the reports is below.

- The Social Security Administrations Information Security Program and Practices for Fiscal Year 2024 (**142401**)
- Security of Common Control Providers (**142319**)
- Security of the Business Services Online (**022329**)

### ■ *Office of Investigations*

We did not close any cases of alleged misconduct by senior government employees that were not disclosed to the public.

## *Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 Compliance*

Section 804(b) of the *Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA)* requires the Office of the Inspector General to report whether the Social Security Administration (SSA) has met the milestones in a remediation plan.

Because SSA is in compliance with the *FFMIA*, it does not have a remediation plan. Therefore, we have no information to report.



## Instances of Social Security Administration Interference or Refusal to Provide Information

During this reporting period, we have no instances of Social Security Administration (SSA) interference with Office of the Inspector General (OIG) independence to report, and no instances to report in which SSA employees refused to provide information or assistance to the OIG.

## Peer Reviews

### ■ *Office of Audit*

*Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards* require our Office of Audit (OA) undergo a peer review every 3 years to determine whether we suitably designed our system of quality control, and whether we are complying with that system, to provide us with reasonable assurance of conforming with applicable professional standards.

We did not complete a peer review of any other Office of the Inspector General (OIG), nor did any other OIG complete a peer review of OA, during this reporting period. There are no outstanding recommendations from prior peer reviews we completed of other OIGs, nor from prior peer reviews other OIGs completed of OA.

We are currently conducting a peer review of the Department of Energy OIG. Department of Defense OIG performed OA's last peer review and issued its peer review report in September 2021. We were scheduled to have a peer review completed this period, but circumstances beyond our control required us to request an extension until September 30, 2025, from the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency and the Government Accountability Office, which was approved.

### ■ *Office of Investigations*

Federal OIG investigative offices must undergo a peer review every 3 years to ensure that the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency *Quality Standards for Investigations and Quality Standards for Digital Forensics* are followed, and that law enforcement powers conferred by Section 6(e) of the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, or other authorities, are properly exercised. Each OIG is required to implement and maintain a system of quality control for its investigative operations to ensure compliance with required standards.

We did not complete a peer review of any other OIG, nor did any other OIG complete a peer review of our Office of Investigations (OI), during this reporting period. There are no outstanding recommendations from prior peer reviews we completed of other OIGs, nor from prior peer reviews other OIGs completed of OI. Department of Homeland Security OIG performed OI's last peer review and issued its peer review report in February 2020.

## Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees Where Allegations of Misconduct Were Substantiated

We did not have any cases involving senior Government employees where allegations of misconduct were substantiated during the reporting period.



# Semiannual Report to Congress

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024

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Office of the Inspector General | OIG 85-007

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